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When the SARS-CoV-2 virus first emerged in December 2019, there were no 
vaccines or treatments, making diagnostic testing the foremost public health tool for 
combating viral transmission. The United States’ decentralized response meant state 
and sub-state level entities took divergent approaches to collecting and reporting testing 
data; acquiring and distributing testing supplies; and determining who should receive 
available tests. This thesis assesses how appropriately the State of Oregon and its public 
health department, the Oregon Health Authority, approached COVID-19 testing. Since 
key roles of public health include providing services for the underserved, promoting 
health equity, and generating data for political decision-making and public 
consumption, assessing Oregon’s response involves investigating whether the state 
responded ethically—addressing disparities in COVID-19 testing—and suitably 
generated and communicated testing-related data. 
Drawing on ethnographic literature concerning data creation, existing ethical 
frameworks, and literature discussing ethical resource allocation during global disease 




by state public health and political officials because the context and process by which 
data was generated was not fully communicated or appreciated. I also argue that the 
distribution of testing supplies and diagnostic tests was unethical because distribution to 
health care providers, counties, and communities was not based on proportionate need 
and because existing barriers to accessing diagnostic tests were not reduced in a way 
that facilitated proportionate distribution. These findings suggest long-term investments 
in public health systems are essential for ensuring an appropriate response to pandemics 
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In December 2019, reports emerged that a novel communicable disease, later 
named COVID-19, was spreading in China. By the end of January 2020, the disease’s 
causative agent, the SARS-CoV-2 virus, had reached the United States and by early 
March the World Health Organization had declared COVID-19 a pandemic. Since 
COVID-19 was a novel disease, there were no diagnostic tests, treatments, or vaccines 
to prevent people from becoming infected or help the ailing recover. While it would 
take four to nine months for effective treatments and vaccines to be developed as part of 
a global scientific effort, diagnostic testing for COVID-19 came online in just a matter 
of weeks, becoming a critical public health tool for combating viral transmission.  
Diagnostic tests are used to track the prevalence and spread of a particular 
disease so that steps can be taken to mitigate transmission. On an individual level, 
testing enables individuals to know their status and adjust their behaviors accordingly. 
On a community level, testing enables public health officials to conduct contact tracing, 
a process in which contacts of a COVID-19 case are contacted so they can isolate 
themselves and prevent further transmission. On a population level, testing produces 
massive amounts of statistics—such as positive and negative test results, total tests, and 
percent positivity (the percent of tests with a positive result)—which allow health 
authorities to determine how the disease spreads and how it is distributed 
geographically or among different demographic groups. This data can be used to make 
decisions on how to allocate resources and the appropriate types of mitigation strategies 




data to document population-level prevalence rates and communicate with the public 
regarding the state or status of a particular disease or disease outbreak. 
Broadly, the role of modern public health systems is to measure, explain and 
improve the public’s overall health using an approach that focuses on collective needs 
and solutions that can be implemented for entire communities. This is in direct contrast 
to the medical field, which aims to cure illness and improve health using interventions 
that focus on the needs of individual patients.1 Public health activities and approaches 
are also strongly based in social justice and health equity—providing health promotion 
and benefits to the entire population, particularly communities who bear larger health 
burdens. For instance, county-level health departments often manage primary care 
services including health promotion, prevention and disease treatment for those with 
barriers to accessing care through the medical system.2 
While measuring and promoting health can take a variety of forms, one explicit 
role of public health is to prevent epidemics and the spread of communicable diseases. 
In the US, the majority of this responsibility is passed on to state and local public health 
departments. While the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)—the federal 
public health agency—sets goals, standards, policies and provides resources, state and 
county-level public health departments primarily monitor diseases within their 
administrative jurisdictions and intervene to prevent them. These processes include 
collecting and analyzing data to better understand disease trends, reporting data 
publicly, screening citizens for certain diseases when they may pose a threat to the 
                                                 
1 Stephen Holland, Public Health Ethics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 2. 
2 Bernard Turnock, Public Health: What it is and How it Works, 2nd ed. (Maryland: Aspen Publishers 




public’s health, using data to guide program implementation and determine how and 
where to distribute resources to help reduce the incidence and prevalence of diseases, 
and educating and informing the public on disease-related information.3  
In Oregon, the state’s public health services—The Oregon Public Health 
Division (OPHD), and the Oregon State Public Health Lab (OSPHL)—are housed 
within the Oregon Health Authority (OHA). The Oregon Health Authority, founded in 
1905, carries out the public health duties outlined above with assistance from the 
OSPHL. The OSPHL, founded in 1903, is a state and federally-funded lab that provides 
testing services to help track and prevent the spread of communicable diseases.4 OHA 
maintains police powers granted to them by the 10th amendment of the US constitution. 
This amendment gives states the power to pass laws to promote the health and well-
being of citizens, including laws that may be coercive such as mandatory vaccinations.5 
Such laws also allow public health to promote health equity. For example, ORS 433.040 
and ORS 433.443 allow OHA’s Public Health Director to, during a state of emergency, 
implement and enforce rules on how vaccines, diagnostic tests, and disease treatments 
are used by healthcare providers. 
In Oregon, a decentralized response at the federal level meant OHA was the lead 
public health agency responding to COVID-19 in the state. The CDC served an 
advisory role for state and county-level departments, but states hardly looked to or 
followed the CDC’s advice from March to September of 2020 due to the politicization 
                                                 
3 Holland, Public Health Ethics, 2.; Turnock, Public Health, 171, 177 and 270. 
4 “Communicable Disease Testing at OSPHL,” Oregon.gov, accessed November 17, 2020, 
https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/LaboratoryServices/CommunicableDiseaseTesting/Pages/index.aspx.  
5 Jenifer Vines and Jessica Hamilton, “Selected Topics in Public Health Law,” (lecture, Portland State 




of public health messaging occurring under the Trump administration. This included 
repeatedly playing down the gravity of the pandemic, overhyping and misstating the 
effectiveness of potential treatments, and sidelining infectious disease and public health 
experts. That same administration did not utilize executive powers to substantially 
increase the availability of COVID-19 testing resources for states. Under these 
circumstances, states were left to respond as they saw fit, making OHA the largest and 
most prominent decision-maker and provider of public health advice in Oregon’s 
COVID-19 response. 
The United States’ decentralized response meant states and sub-state level 
entities took divergent approaches to collecting and reporting testing data; acquiring and 
distributing testing supplies; and determining who should receive the limited number of 
available tests. Given OHA’s immense authority and involvement in Oregon’s COVID-
19 response, it is critical to look at how the agency responded as a case study of state-
level response during the pandemic. It is also critical to focus on diagnostic testing 
because it was a crucial tool in combating COVID-19 during 2020 in the absence of 
vaccines or proven treatments for the disease. The goal of this thesis is to assess how 
appropriately OHA and the State of Oregon responded to COVID-19 testing. Since key 
roles of public health include providing services for the underserved, promoting health 
equity, and generating data for political decision-making and public consumption, 
assessing Oregon’s response involves investigating whether the state responded 
ethically—addressing disparities in COVID-19 testing—and suitably generated and 




I ask the following questions in order to determine how appropriately Oregon 
implemented and assessed COVID-19 testing from late February 2020 to mid-
September 2020: 
1. How did the Oregon Health Authority (OHA) collect and report testing 
data? How did data influence the public and political decisions? What 
were the implications of data inaccuracies?  
2. What was the logic, rhetoric, and data driving protocols determining how 
COVID-19 testing resources were distributed and who would get tested? 
Did protocols result in an ethical distribution of testing? 
Based on a close analysis of Oregon’s response to COVID-19 testing from 
March to September 2020, I argue that testing data was misconstrued by the Oregon 
public and misused by state public health and political officials because the context and 
process by which data was generated was not fully communicated or appreciated. I also 
argue that the distribution of testing supplies and diagnostic tests was unethical because 
distribution to health care providers, counties, and communities was not based on 
proportionate need and because existing barriers to accessing diagnostic tests were not 





Overview of the Testing Process and Types of Diagnostic Tests  
There are two types of COVID-19 tests, diagnostic tests - which are used to 
determine if someone is currently infected with the causative agent, the SARS-CoV-2 
virus - and serology tests - which determine if someone was previously infected with 
COVID-19. In this thesis, I will be focusing on diagnostic tests, as they are the most 
critical for combating COVID-19 transmission. These tests can be divided into two 
categories— PCR tests that look for the genetic material of the SARS-CoV-2 virus that 
causes COVID-19 and antigen tests that look for viral proteins. “Point-of-care” (POC) 
and “rapid” tests are more general terms for tests that can be performed at the site of a 
medical provider (and not a laboratory) and tests that return results in a short period of 
time (for COVID-19 around 5 to 15 minutes), respectively. POC tests use both genetic 
material and protein-detection methodologies, while rapid tests, in the context of 
COVID-19, refer specifically to COVID-19 antigen tests. PCR tests are considered the 
gold standard for diagnostic tests and are the most accurate. However, they require 
more supplies, staffing, and high-tech equipment in laboratories, take longer to perform, 
and are more expensive than other test options. POC and antigen tests do not require a 
lab, and take less time and fewer resources to complete, but are less accurate than PCR 
tests. 
The two major components of diagnostic testing are specimen collection and 
specimen analysis. In the first step, specimen collection, patients being tested for 
COVID-19 provide a fluid sample from either their nose, mouth, or back of the throat 




collected from those locations using a medical-grade swab similar to a Q-tip or by 
spitting saliva into a tube. In Oregon, sample collection is conducted by hospitals or 
outpatient clinics, public health authorities, emergency medical service providers, or 
commercial pharmacies like Walgreens and CVS. Test samples are also collected by 
other public workers such as qualified nurses or qualified individuals working in long-
term care or correctional facilities, or by private lab companies offering testing services 
to workplaces. 
Following specimen collection, the specimens must be analyzed for the presence 
of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, and this is where the testing process differs depending on the 
type of diagnostic test being performed. For PCR tests, specimens are stored and 
transported to a lab. In some cases, samples are collected and then analyzed by the same 
entity. Private healthcare providers that are a part of larger systems often have in-house 
labs to send tests to. Smaller clinics or pharmacies that are not affiliated with larger 
medical systems with labs use contracts with private local or national commercial labs 
to have specimens analyzed. Often, specimens collected by local public health 
authorities or at long-term care or correctional facilities are sent to OSPHL or to private 
labs contracted by those facilities. Once reaching those labs, trained technicians prepare 
the specimen and mix it with a specific set of chemicals, often pre-packaged in a 
“testing kit.” That mixture is then analyzed by a machine for SARS-CoV-2 genetic 
material. 
Anyone with POC tests can analyze samples in a non-lab setting with special 
machines. The specimen is placed into the machine alongside a COVID-19-specific 




machines can often analyze specimens for many types of viruses using the same 
process, so COVID-19-specific testing kits are required in order to look for SARS-
CoV-2 in the sample. Antigen tests work similarly to POC tests, except the machines 
and chemicals are meant to detect virus proteins as opposed to genetic material. 
Overview of Where and Why Testing Occurs 
Diagnostic testing is carried out by two entities: healthcare (or medical) systems 
and public health authorities. Testing by public health authorities is often termed 
“community testing,” and is intended to be low-barrier and target at-risk groups and 
communities with limited access to testing from medical systems. Testing at these 
events is typically free and the criteria for testing less restrictive than in healthcare 
settings. Community testing events often advertise that a person does not need to have 
insurance or documentation of legal residency to get tested. Events are sometimes 
advertised in languages other than English, held in locations outside formal medical 
facilities (such as schools or community centers), and are intended for communities in 
need of testing. All of these distinct features attempt to recognize potential barriers to 
testing and create protocols and events that will encourage people to participate 
voluntarily. While community testing has lower barriers to entry than medical systems, 
these events occur less often and in fewer places than testing offered by on-demand 
medical systems. 
While state public health departments aim to serve underserved communities 
through their testing efforts, the medical system—which in the US has dominated 
public heath for decades and is mostly run by privately-owned hospitals, clinics or 




to data published on OHA’s COVID-19 website, in late March the OSPHL was 
performing around 28% of the state’s COVID-19 diagnostic tests. The percent of tests 
performed at the OSPHL declined steadily throughout April and in May 2020 hovered 
around 4-6%, where it remained through the rest of the summer.6 So, while the role of 
public health departments is to diagnose and prevent the spread of disease, the private 
medical system, and not the public health system, conducts most of the diagnosing often 
in the process of treating individual patients. However, public health does track test 
results performed by the medical system for many reportable diseases to track 
transmission on a population level and provide appropriate interventions if needed. 
There are many reasons for someone to get tested at a medical provider or for 
public health authorities to offer testing to individuals. Medical providers test patients 
for the purpose of diagnosing disease. Individuals who are ill or experiencing disease 
symptoms are tested in order to confirm the type of illness a patient has and provide the 
appropriate treatment. Medical providers might also suggest a test for someone who 
was in close contact to an ill patient, whether or not that contact has symptoms, in order 
to make sure they were not also infected.  
Public health mainly provides routine or mass testing that targets at-risk groups, 
and provides tests without regard to symptom status. Routine testing would involve 
repeatedly testing a specific group in the population over some period of time—for 
instance, testing injection drug users for HIV once a year because they are at greater 
risk of contracting HIV through shared needle use. Mass testing involves testing all 
                                                 
6 Based on author calculations using data published publicly by OHA: Oregon Health Authority, 





individuals in a specific group of the population once. For example, if lettuce sold in a 
grocery store were contaminated with an infectious bacterium, public health might test 
everyone who bought and ate the lettuce. If they test negative, they were likely not 
infected and do not need to be tested again. If positive, public health authorities would 
have evidence of a possible disease outbreak, and would inform the public about the 
outbreak and potential risk of consuming the contaminated produce. 
Why Equity in Oregon’s COVID-19 Testing Response Deserves Attention  
While public health and medical services such as diagnostic testing are, in 
theory, available to everyone, there are clear historic inequities in accessing such 
services. There are larger issues at play with regard to how certain groups, particularly 
ethnic minorities and those with lower socioeconomic status (SES), interact with the 
health care system. It is important to note that race, ethnicity and SES are closely 
intertwined. Race and ethnicity are often variables that influence SES, as policies and 
systems that prevent individuals from obtaining higher SES more greatly impact racial 
and ethnic minorities.  
 It has been well documented that racial and ethnic minorities (such as Latinx, 
African American, Native American/Native Alaskan, Pacific Islanders) as well as 
individuals with a lower SES interact with the medical system and utilize health care 
services less often than white Americans and higher SES Americans, respectively.7 This 
puts racial and ethnic minorities and lower SES Americans at a disadvantage when 
                                                 
7 SES as measured by education, income, and insurance status, were less likely to have contacted a doctor 





accessing diagnostic testing services.8 This disparity is the result of centuries of 
discrimination in the medical system, ranging from systemic barriers such as access to 
insurance and culturally appropriate care to direct discrimination experienced by racial 
and ethnic minorities when accessing services. It also means that communities of color 
are more likely to access COVID-19 testing at community testing sites rather than 
through interactions with the medical system.  
In Oregon, there are stark inequalities in how health insurance coverage is 
distributed across the state. In 2018, Oregon’s Latinx, Native American/Pacific Islander, 
and African American populations had 16.2%, 12.5% and 8.5% uninsured rates 
respectively, while the uninsurance rate among white Oregonians was 6.5%. In 2019, 
uninsurance rates among those living less than 400% above the federal poverty level 
(FPL) were double the uninsurance rate in Oregonians living above 400% of the FPL. 
Uninsurance rates were also 2.5 times higher among unemployed than employed 
Oregonians.9 Lower rates of insurance among ethnic and racial minorities and lower 
SES Oregonians means these groups are more likely to forgo medical care to avoid 
costly expenses. As a result, these groups are less likely to utilize health care services 
                                                 
8 For Oregon data on race/ethnicity-based differences in healthcare utilization see K. John McConnell et 
al., “Oregon’s Emphasis On Equity Shows Signs Of Early Success For Black And American Indian 
Medicaid Enrollees,” Health Affairs 37, no. 3 (2018), 392, 10.1377/hlthaff.2017.1282. For ethnic and 
racial disparities in access to care country-wide see Glenn Flores and Hua Lin, “Trends in Racial/Ethnic 
Disparities in Medical and Oral Health, Access to Care, and Use of Services in US Children: Has 
Anything Changed Over the Years?,” International Journal for Equity in Health 12, no. 1 (2013), 
https://doi.org/10.1186/1475-9276-12-10 and Jennifer I. Manuel, “Racial/Ethnic and Gender Disparities 
in Health Care Use and Access,” Health Services Research 53, no. 3 (2018), 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.12705. For SES-based differences see Debra Blackwell et al., 
“Socioeconomic Status and Utilization of Health Care Services in Canada and the United States: Findings 
From a Binational Health Survey,” Medical Care 47, no. 11 (2009): 1142, 
doi:10.1097/MLR.0b013e3181adcbe9.  






due to an inability to pay for those services, and have less experienced navigating health 
systems and accessing medical services. 
Lack of access to culturally appropriate care and previous experiences with lived 
discrimination means fear of entering the medical system for communities of color. 
Among undocumented immigrants, there is the added fear of deportation, a fear which 
deters portions of the Latinx community in the US from accessing medical services. In 
2016, the Oregon Health Authority noted that 11 counties had shortages of primary care 
professionals for migrant farmworker populations, which encompass many 
undocumented workers and Latinx workers. From 2016 to 2021, the percent of Latinx, 
African American and American Indian or Alaska Native healthcare professionals was, 
across the board, lower than their representation in the general population.10 This 
suggests that there are not enough professionals to offer culturally appropriate 
healthcare services to Oregonians of color. 
This history and underutilization of medical care also places racial and ethnic 
minorities and Oregonians with a lower socioeconomic status (SES) at a disadvantage 
when they do want to access services, as individuals are less likely to have experience 
navigating complicated health systems. Yet, most COVID-19 diagnostic testing was 
occurring in the private medical system, meaning these groups were likely underserved, 
                                                 
10 Oregon Health Authority, “American Community Survey Data Release: Uninsurance Rates Remained 
Low in Oregon and Nationwide in 2018,” Oregon.gov, last modified September 2019, https://www. 
oregon.gov/oha/HPA/ANALYTICS/InsuranceData/2018-ACS-Fact-Sheet-Oregon-National-Data.pdf; 
Office of Forecasting, Research and Analysis, Oregon Health Authority, “Primary Care Health 
Professional Shortage Area (HPSA) Designations by Type, As of 01/01/16,” Oregon.gov, last modified 
February 10, 2016, https://www.oregon.gov/oha/HPA/HP-PCO/Documents/2016-PC-HPSA-Map.pdf; 






overlooked and placed at a disadvantage when seeking testing from very early stages of 
the pandemic because they could not simply contact a medical provider. 
There were many resources of varying quality to which those without a simple 
way of accessing medical services could turn to find COVID-19 testing. Formal 
resources were mostly online and included provider websites, county health department 
websites, and the Oregon Health Authority’s testing locator. Oregon also has a 211-
phone number, which connects Oregonians to human services and health information 
and services in the state. Despite the existence of state and medical resources for 
accessing testing, these resources were incomplete for Oregonians without internet 
access, non-English speakers, undocumented, and Black, Indigenous and People of 
Color (BIPOC) with histories of negative interactions in the medical system.  
For instance, for Oregonians who did not have internet access, 211 was the only 
non-online resource available, limiting their information source options compared to 
Oregonians with internet access. These individuals would have to rely on 211 or word-
of-mouth to connect with an entity offering COVID-19 tests. Oregonians who did not 
speak English at a certain level of fluency would have difficulty utilizing online 
resources such as OHA’s testing locator or county public health department websites, 
which were mostly in English and sometimes Spanish (and very infrequently in other 
languages). As one example, 70% of Latinx Oregonians in Lane County who utilized 
community testing services reported hearing about the event through a community-




about the event through the county public health department, exemplifying that minority 
communities were generally not relying on mainstream resources produced by OHA.11 
Access to information from county public health departments was also 
incomplete. Despite the fact that phase 1 reopening applications submitted in late April 
2020 required counties to outline how they would advertise testing, only 10 out of 
Oregon’s 36 counties provided specific information addressing this topic, while 5 
instead discussed COVID-19 community education and outreach more generally.12 
Therefore, it is not surprising testing information on various county public health 
department websites differed. Some did not list any testing sites located in their county, 
others advertised only community testing events or medical providers offering testing, 
and a few provided information on both.13 Differences across counties in COVID-19 
test advertising made it easier for residents of some counties who had easy access to the 
internet, and were English speakers, to find testing, and harder for others. 
Additional fear-based barriers further discouraged some from even attempting to  
access a test. A positive COVID-19 diagnosis means self-isolating for up to two weeks. 
For essential and frontline workers who cannot work from home - such as factory, 
service and agricultural workers – this means two weeks without work and possibly 
without pay. This possibility may deter these workers from getting tested in the first 
                                                 
11 Kristin Yarris and Dayna Hansberger, “Barriers to Coronavirus Testing and Health Communication 
among Latinx Communities During COVID-19: Exploratory Findings from Oregon,” (working paper, 
Faculty of Global Studies, University of Oregon, Eugene, 2020), 7. Cited with permission. 
12 Refer to the document series: Oregon Phase 1 County Reopening Applications. Oregon Office of the 
Governor. April and May 2020. https://govstatus.egov.com/reopening-oregon for Benton, Crook, Gilliam, 
Harney, Hood River, Jefferson, Klamath, Lake, Lincoln, Malheur, Morrow, Multnomah, Tillamook, 
Wallowa, Wasco counties. 
13 This observation is based on visiting county-level public health departments websites for Lane, Union, 
Malheur, Umatilla, Jefferson, Multnomah, Washington and Clatsop counties regularly throughout June, 





place, even if they believe they have COVID-19. Since racial and ethnic minority 
groups make up a larger proportion of essential and frontline workers who cannot work 
from home,14 and frontline workers are generally more likely to be of lower SES, they 
are disproportionally burdened with this fear of testing. 
It was obvious that in Oregon, the pandemic was having a larger effect on 
BIPOC communities, and likely that the effect was similar in those with a lower 
socioeconomic status. COVID-19 mitigation measures such as physical distancing, 
quarantine and isolation, are generally more difficult for those with lower SES and 
fewer resources, increasing risk of COVID-19 exposure. By May 2020, data showed 
that case rates were higher among BIPOC individuals. The case rate among white 
Oregonians was 4.6 cases per 10,000 people. Case rates among African Americans and 
American Indian/Alaskan Natives were two times higher.15 While there is no state-level 
data breaking down cases by socioeconomic status (SES) in Oregon, studies at the 
national level have found that lower SES is correlated with higher COVID-19 case 
rates.16  
All of these factors—discrimination, uninsurance, frontline worker status, lower 
rates of health care service utilization, and a lack of culturally appropriate care—mean 
                                                 
14 Melissa S. Kearney and Luke Pardue, “Exposure on the Job: Who Are the Essential Workers Who 
Likely Cannot Work from Home?,” The Brookings Institute, last modified May 7, 2020, 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/exposure-on-the-job/?utm_campaign=Economic%20Studies&utm_ 
source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=87814493. 
15 Oregon Health Authority, “COVID-19 Weekly Report,” Oregon.gov, May 5, 2020, 
https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/DISEASESCONDITIONS/DISEASESAZ/Emerging%20Respitory%20I
nfections/COVID-19-Weekly-Report-2020-08-05-FINAL.pdf.  
16 Sean A.P. Clouston, Ginny Natale, Bruce G. Link, “Socioeconomic Inequalities in the Spread of 
Coronavirus-19 in the United States: An Examination of the Emergence of Social Inequalities,” Social 
Science & Medicine 268, (2021): 113554, doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2020.113554; R.B. Hawkins, E.J. 
Charles, J.H. Mehaffey, “Socio-economic Status and COVID-19-related Cases and Fatalities,” Public 




racial and ethnic minorities and those with lower SES face greater barriers to accessing 
medical services, including COVID-19 testing, and might be less likely to seek out 
those services, despite being at risk for contracting the disease. These barriers, coupled 
with higher COVID-19 case rates, demonstrate why it is crucial for the government and 






This research draws from and contributes to existing anthropology literature 
focusing on “ethnographies of data;” literature discussing different ethical frameworks 
for evaluating public health interventions; and medical/public health literature on how 
scarce resources should be allocated during global disease outbreaks. 
Ethnographies of Data  
There are a vast amount of ethnographies of data that investigate how data is 
collected and compiled, and how it influences political decision-making. This literature 
focuses not on how accurate data is, but the contexts under which it is generated, shaped 
and altered as it develops into its final publicly-presented form, and investigates the 
meanings and values that become attached to those often quantitative pieces of data. 
The overwhelming conclusions from these ethnographic studies are that the process of 
generating data creates truths and knowledge laden with social, cultural, and historical 
meanings, and does not accurately or completely reflect the worlds it aims to measure. 
In The Seductions of Quantification, Sally Engle Merry explores how violence 
against women and human trafficking are measured globally and she demonstrates how 
there is no single, clear, universally-agreed upon way of measuring either one. Data 
collectors make deliberate decisions about how to define and measure the terms. This 
results in multiple approaches to measuring the same issue, with each approach 
measuring something different and producing different results which shape how such 
topics are conceptualized and addressed. She also argues that aggregated statistics often 
conceal local contexts, yet it is these composite statistics that are often most influential 




as an organized crime, implying that it should be combated via the justice system. This 
ignores social, economic, and political contexts that lead to trafficking in the first 
place.17 
Cooking Data: Culture and Politics in An African Research World by Crystal 
Biruk, presents an ethnographic account of how quantitative data on HIV and AIDS in 
Malawi is collected, compiled, and produced. Her findings reveal that even before the 
data collection begins, behind the scenes choices delimit and determine the quality and 
nature of the data collected in surveys. This is because survey questions are written to 
extract particular responses, discounting other possible responses. When surveys are 
actually distributed, poorly constructed questions result in miscommunications between 
researchers and participants. If a respondent does not interpret a question the way 
researchers intended, or if all survey respondents interpret the question differently, it 
degrades data quality.  
Biruk also demonstrates how claims made from poor data on HIV and AIDS in 
Malawi are validated by those seen as a local authorities or experts, despite the fact that 
the studies producing the data did not utilize the appropriate methodology or contain 
strong enough data to support those claims, because the data is presented in a way that 
satisfies or confirms cultural or pervasive rhetoric. Therefore unsupported data and 
claims become validated more easily and are used to support national-level government 
policies on HIV prevention interventions. In this way, Biruk argues, poor data not only 
misrepresents the real world, but creates new ones.18 
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In Poor Numbers: How We Are Misled by African Development Statistics and 
What to Do about It, Morten Jerven provides an ethnography of development statistics 
on the African continent. Jerven reveals that the production of economic data in and 
about African countries is the result of choices subject to data availability, resources and 
other constraints. He describes how these constraints result in data that is based on 
educated guesses and debatable assumptions, which cause errors in data that over- or 
underestimate metrics. Jerven points out that data users, such as governments or 
researchers, are not able to assess the reliability of statistics and whether they are in line 
with perceived realities. If the data seems reasonable, no one questions it. Jerven argues 
that this is problematic because inaccurate data is used by governments to allocate 
resources. Like Biruk, Jerven concludes that collecting data is a form of knowledge 
creation.19 As a result, he argues that metrics should “not be treated as an objective 
number but as a number that is a product of a process in which a range of arbitrary and 
controversial assumptions are made.”20 
Although Merry, Biruk and Jervens’ work is not COVID19-specific, the issues 
they raise around how data is collected, created and used are relevant to any situation in 
which data is generated and/or utilized by governments. This thesis adds to this existing 
literature by describing similar examples of how data—specifically public health data 
on COVID-19 testing produced by the Oregon Health Authority—fell victim to these 
same issues and become laden with misunderstandings and misuses. 
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Ethical Frameworks in Relation to Public Health 
While there is little literature on the ethical distribution of diagnostic testing 
resources specifically, there are many broad ethical frameworks that can be used to 
determine whether or not Oregon’s response to COVID-19 diagnostic testing from 
March 2020 to September 2020 was ethical. Since public health is rooted in social 
justice, an ethical framework that conceptually aligns with the term best applies. Within 
the context of public health, social justice is the idea that societies are responsible for 
ensuring that health and health resources are fairly distributed among a population by 
focusing on the needs of the disadvantaged, a task that often requires providing 
additional resources to those communities.21 
Utilitarianism holds that the right action is one which brings about the best 
consequences. In the case of public health, that means maximizing well-being, welfare, 
or benefit. It is important to note that maximizing benefit does not inherently equate to 
doing good for the greatest number of people, although often times this is the case. 
According to this theory, everyone’s well-being counts equally.22 While this may seem 
beneficial from a public health perspective, when well-being is disproportionately 
distributed (e.g. among socioeconomic classes, racial and ethics groups, genders) 
favoring everyone equally allows inequity to persist. For instance, if there are a limited 
number of treatments for a disease, the most benefit would come from using all of them. 
However, because utilitarianism treats everyone equally, the treatments would be doled 
out to anyone with the disease without regard or preference for individuals in 
                                                 
21 Turnock, Public Health, 15; Lawrence O. Gostin and Madison Powers, “What Does Social Justice 
Require For The Public's Health? Public Health Ethics And Policy Imperatives,” Health Affairs 25, no. 4 
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communities that face a higher burden of that disease. While there would be equal 
benefit to treating the same number of people in an overall less burdened population and 
a more burdened population, this conflicts with a social-justice approach because while 
it brings benefit, it does not equitably distribute that benefit or favor those with larger 
burdens. 
Libertarianism is a philosophy that seeks to protect personal liberties and the 
ability of individuals to exercise their fundamental rights. A core tenet of this 
philosophy is that there is minimal interference in one’s choices and behaviors, 
particularly by authorities.23 This framework quickly falls apart when applied to public 
health. One major goal of public health is to improve the health of populations, and 
often times public health policies must infringe on the right to personal choice in order 
to favor the well-being of the population as a whole. As Holland points out “Very often, 
ethical concerns about public health arise because initiatives and policies are proposed 
and implemented that can be expected to maintain or improve the health of a target 
population, but at the expense of some of its individual members.”24  
For instance, in order to enroll in public school, children must have completed a 
mandated set of vaccinations (although there are laws that allow for medical and 
religious exemptions). Requiring these vaccinations eliminates one’s freedom to choose 
whether or not be to vaccinated in order to prevent deadly childhood illnesses from 
spreading in communities. Libertarianism would oppose this public health mandate 
because under this framework the loss of autonomy is the core decider of what actions 
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are right or wrong. Utilitarianism would be the more appropriate framework to apply to 
this public health initiative because laws supporting mandatory vaccination provides the 
most benefit to the greatest number of people. Although some may be harmed by loss of 
freedom, overall the benefit to the whole community is greatest. 
Egalitarianism is a philosophy that denies differences among groups of people 
based on irrelevant differences (such as gender, class, race, ethnicity etc.).25 In society, 
capital and resources are not equally distributed, and as a result, neither are health 
outcomes. Under the egalitarian framework, this is viewed as unjust, and in order to 
correct this unjustness, actions must be taken to mitigate or right inequities.26 From a 
public health standpoint, this means allocating more resources towards communities 
with worse health outcomes or at greater risk for poor health outcomes and removing 
systemic barriers.27 While utilitarianism might agree with allocating resources towards 
those same communities under the idea that doing so would create the most benefit 
because health would improve more than the same resources in a healthier community, 
the philosophy does not require it. If it were found that at least the same benefit could 
come from using resources elsewhere, such a use would be justified. Egalitarianism’s 
focus, on the other hand, explicitly aims to reduce inequities by prioritizing worst off. 
Since public health is rooted in social justice and supporting the least advantaged to 
                                                 
25 Stanley I. Benn, “Equality Moral and Social,” In Encyclopedia of Philosphy, 2nd ed., 10 vols., (Detroit: 
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Equality, ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), 13-17. 
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ensure that health and health resources are fairly distributed, this makes it the ideal way 
to frame and understand how ethical public health interventions are. 
Ethical Distribution of Resources During a Pandemic 
Medical and public health literature following the SARS epidemic in 2003 and 
the H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2009 analyzed these public health emergencies using 
ethical frameworks. Both outbreaks put a strain on medical resources, and medical and 
public health professionals realized pandemic preparedness needed to better address the 
ethics surrounding scarce resource allocation, since shortages would inevitably arise in 
a pandemic. Most of this literature focuses on medical supplies other than diagnostic 
testing, such as hospital beds, PPE, vaccines and treatments. I could not find any 
literature published before the COVID-19 pandemic that explicitly mentions a 
framework for distributing diagnostic testing supplies, and only a few pieces of 
literature on COVID-19 bring up how COVID-19 testing can be ethically distributed. 
That being said, there are a few salient principles for distributing scarce resources 
during a pandemic. 
While the value of equity holds that everyone should have equal access to 
resources28 when it is not possible to provide everyone with resources, prioritization 
must occur. One common consensus among medical literature is that healthcare workers 
and those who provide essential services for communities should be prioritized, because 
without their labor and expertise, everyone would be worse off. Even fewer people 
would be able to receive medical services and there would be shortages of critical 
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resources such as food and infrastructures would fall apart.29 This aligns with arguments 
that resources should be allocated to minimize social disruption (a more utilitarianism 
approach), although the extent to which minimizing social disruption should be 
prioritized over other methods is contested, with some authors not making a distinction 
and others placing it as a secondary priority.30 
Public health literature disagrees with a focus on healthcare and essential 
workers, calling for an egalitarian approach that favors marginalized and disadvantaged 
communities, namely minorities, the disabled, and low-income populations. Baylis, 
Kenny and Sherwin argue that present public health ethical frameworks draw too much 
from medical ethics frameworks that focus equal distribution of resources among 
individuals. The authors argue that existing medical literature fails to capture ethical 
strategies that are concerned with public well-being in the same way public health as a 
field does. They argue that ethical frameworks guiding public health responses during 
pandemics must be rooted in population-based approaches that focus on collective 
needs and solutions while addressing and giving priority to those who are systematically 
disadvantaged and marginalized when responding to pandemics.31 
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DeBruin, Liaschenko, and Marshall second this framework for pandemic 
planning and argue that focusing on the individual leads to utilitarian approaches that 
apply the same levels of access to everyone, rather than an egalitarian approach that 
skews resources towards the disadvantaged and less privileged. The authors also argue 
that most approaches discussed in medical literature fail to address barriers to accessing 
resources. Therefore, in a pandemic situation, after identifying the most at-risk groups, 
officials could provide resources to those groups proportionate to the increased risk they 
face and actively work to reduce barriers to utilizing those resources. 
It is important to note that a social-justice-based approach does not have to 
prioritize the disadvantaged over the advantaged to make up for historic injustices or 
allocate resources exclusively or preferentially to socially vulnerable communities. 
Vawter et al. argues that considering other risks (such as morbidity, mortality and 
potential exposure) will by nature afford priority to the socially vulnerable. For 
instance, in many cases essential workers who are more likely to be exposed are a part 
of marginalized populations either as a racial or ethnic minority or due to their lower 
economic status. These groups are also more likely to have underlying medical 
conditions that exacerbate the severity of many diseases, which would position them to 
have priority under a morbidity, mortality, exposure prioritization model as well.32 
Therefore, the social vulnerability framework does not go against prioritizing healthcare 
and essential workers and are not mutually exclusive in practice. 
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Despite disagreements over what constitutes ethical prioritization, one 
consensus is that some sort of framework is needed in order to act ethically. Choices 
about where scarce resources go should not be left for clinicians or other health care 
workers to make on a case-by-case basis. Such a situation puts individuals on the spot 
and forces them to improvise, leading to inconsistent practices and a potentially 
unethical allocation.33 Furthermore, without any sort of framework, allocation would 
resort to a first-come first-serve basis, which would only serve to exacerbate 
inequalities in accessing resources.34 The literature also agrees that it is appropriate to 
change ethical frameworks to respond to extant circumstances. Allowing for this type of 
flexibility provides opportunities to best achieve ethical resource distribution when new 
cases, challenges or information comes to light.35 Lastly, information regarding 
allocation protocols must be rapidly and clearly communicated to both the health 
industry and the public in order to ensure that ethical protocols are effectively 
understood and implemented.36 
This medical literature, alongside an egalitarian framework, provides a clear 
picture for what an ethical public health response to COVID-19 testing should look like. 
An ethical response should distribute resources proportionate to need, significantly 
reduce or remove existing barriers, and avoid case-by-case decisions and first-come-
first-serve distribution. I will contribute to this existing literature by exploring how the 
discussed ethical approaches apply in a public health setting and investigating whether 
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these approaches were integrated into Oregon’s response to COVID-19 testing from 





My research draws on both qualitative and quantitative data documenting the 
first six months of the pandemic in Oregon: between March 15, 2020 and September 15, 
2020. I analyze documents published publicly online or obtained through public records 
requests to the Oregon Health Authority. Daily Google alerts using the terms 
“Coronavirus Oregon” and “Oregon testing” were also used to keep track of new 
COVID-19 testing developments in Oregon in order to guide document collection and 
public record requests. Since COVID-19 was a newly emerging pandemic disease, it 
was unclear what information was being collected and reported. This information was 
also constantly changing. Therefore, a wide net was cast to collect as many documents 
and as much data as possible. As information was gathered and initially reviewed, 
testing emerged as a salient issue. This early work informed the research questions as 
well as what data would continue to be collected and analyzed. 
The final dataset includes more than one hundred unique types of documents 
and more than a thousand individual documents. The data includes: 
• data and surveys collected and compiled by OHA on COVID-19 testing 
and testing capacity in Oregon filled out by medical providers, 
• documents and communications from OHA, the Oregon Office of 
Emergency Management, and the Oregon Department of Administrative 
Services outlining the acquisition, distribution, and use of testing 
supplies 
• documents published by OHA, the Oregon Office of the Governor, 
Oregon’s Department of Human Services and Department of Corrections 
outlining plans and goals for testing in the state 





• documents from Oregon county-level public health departments and 
Oregon health care providers outlining testing efforts at a local level 
• newspaper articles 
After data collection, all documents describing COVID-19 testing were 
imported into the software program Scrivener, while quantitative data was compiled in 
Excel. Documents and data were organized into three distinct categories based on 
whether they discussed testing data, testing supply distribution, or testing use and 
accessibility. A summary of the information extracted from each source type can be 
found in table 1. Documents were analyzed for this information and notes were made 
regarding patterns and trends. Most trends and observations were discussed in weekly 
phone meetings with primary advisor Dr. Melissa Graboyes, who provided suggestions 
for further source materials and approaches to analyzing the data. 
Source Category Information Extracted and Analyzed 
Testing data 
• what COVID-19 testing data OHA reported 
• how OHA reported the data 
• the frequency of data reporting 
• methods of data collection 
• assumptions built into data 
• what the data claimed to show vs what the data actually revealed  
• where there were gaps in the data 
Distribution of testing 
supplies 
• how testing supplies were acquired and distributed  
• what metrics were used to determine such distributions 
Testing use and 
accessibility 
• where testing was and was not occurring 
• who was being tested, who wasn’t being tested 
• the potential and actual barriers to accessing tests 
• how testing differed in different locations at different times 
• how government entities described and justified testing 
protocols 
 
Table 1. Summary of Data Types and the Extraction and Analysis Process 
There are a few drawbacks to this data collection and analysis approach. There 




produced by the Oregon state government on COVID-19 testing. Because information 
was released as it came out, there was no way to know what sources would become 
available or find all of them. In order to gather as much relevant data as possible, I 
focused on documents released by the OHA and the Oregon Governor’s Office and 
used news articles to help direct me towards in-depth case studies and examples that 
were widely discussed publicly. However, it is possible that I failed to capture events or 
examples that refute my arguments. Additionally, my limited focus on the first six 
months of testing does not necessarily reflect how Oregon handled other aspects of the 
pandemic or their response beyond six months. 
Each chapter in this thesis will begin by presenting relevant background 
information and an overview of my findings and arguments, then present the in-depth 
evidence, and finish with a discussion of the presented evidence through an ethical lens. 
The in-depth evidence includes both formal and modified case studies varying in length 
and detail that highlight my arguments. Case studies were chosen as they were a simple 
and clear way of exemplifying my findings and a way to present the strongest and most 





Chapter 2: COVID-19 Testing Data 
A critical element in public health’s ability to prevent illness and protect the 
health of the public is data. Data can help authorities determine how diseases spread and 
the populations most affected to inform what interventions are needed and where. 
However, the data’s ability to effectively inform interventions depends upon the quality 
of the data. Finalized data is often built on limitations—such as financial resources, 
political needs and data availability—as well as preconceived definitions and 
assumptions.37 Therefore, it is critical to understand how the data was generated in 
order to understand what conclusions can be drawn from the data and how those 
conclusions can be used to improve current and future public health interventions. 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Oregon Health Authority collected data on 
COVID-19 via surveys and the mandatory reporting of disease cases. Public health laws 
in Oregon require medical providers to report cases of certain communicable diseases to 
OHA, and in early March 2020 new legislation required the reporting of COVID-19 
cases, positive and negative test results, hospitalizations, and deaths.38 OHA also used 
surveys to collect information on COVID-19-related metrics such as testing capacity. 
Since health authorities relied heavily on data to validate public health responses and 
interventions and educate the public, it is crucial that the data is critically assessed, as it 
is not immune to the discussed phenomena.  
This chapter presents two case studies that illustrate how changes in data 
collection and reporting methods had significant impacts on public perception and 
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political decision-making. The chapter argues that COVID-19 testing data was 
constructed using pre-made, arbitrary assumptions made by data collectors. These 
preconceived assumptions created a certain narrative that dictated public perceptions 
regarding the extent of testing in Oregon and was used as a basis for making important 
public health decisions/policies. 
Case Study 1: The Reporting of COVID-19 Test Metrics 
This case study demonstrates how different representations of testing data 
affected public perception and public health responses to COVID-19 testing in Oregon. 
From March to December 3, 2020, the Oregon Health Authority used a reporting 
method that severely undercounted how many positive, negative and total tests were 
performed daily in Oregon. Yet, OHA did not clearly communicate what reporting 
method was being used or that it could lead to an undercount, generating a false 
perception that Oregon was performing much less testing compared to other states when 
that was not necessarily the case. On December 3, 2020 OHA switched to a different 
reporting method. This change appreciably altered testing statistics including the 
number of tests performed and the percent positivity rate. This observation is significant 
because these metrics informed COVID-19-related government policies such as 
whether schools could open for in-person learning. Therefore, changes in how data was 
reported altered what activities were allowed in Oregon. 
As mandated by emergency rule OAR 333-018-0900—passed on March 15, 
2020 and permanently adopted in September 2020—all positive COVID-19 test results 
in Oregon must be reported to OHA within in 24 hours, while negative results must be 




where anyone could view statistics on how many positive, negative, and total tests were 
reported each day in Oregon. 
When OHA began publicly reporting testing data, it only depicted results from 
new people being tested (a person-based reporting method) and not the total number of 
tests performed (a test-based reporting method). When new test results come in, OHA 
sifted through them and excluded test results from Oregonians who had already been 
tested. The state would log a maximum of one negative test per person and one positive 
test per person over a 90-day period.39 Therefore, OHA’s data systematically 
undercounted the number of tests performed by the state each day and each week by 
leaving out test results from individuals who tested positive multiple times within 90 
days after their first positive result and leaving out test results for individuals who tested 
negative more than once.40 
However, OHA did not readily provide this information to the public. 
Information indicating that OHA’s data represented new people tested and not total tests 
was not communicated in any location where COVID-19 testing data was actually 
presented. The only public mention of this distinction was an OHA Facebook live held 
on July 15, 2020, a video viewed by far fewer Oregonians (a few thousand) compared 
to OHA’s websites with the testing data itself.41 This made it impossible for anyone 
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viewing data to know it only reflected the number of Oregonians tested and was 
therefore an undercount of the total number of tests performed. As a result, countless 
Oregonians—as well as the rest of the country who viewed this data on compilation 
sites like the COVID-19 Tracking Project—were misinformed as to how many COVID-
19 tests were performed in Oregon daily. It was not until late November, seven months 
after OHA began reporting testing data, that they offered more publicized clarity on 
how it reported COVID-19 tests,42 far too late for correcting public understanding. 
On December 3, 2020, OHA shifted to a test-based reporting method and began 
reporting the total number of tests performed on Oregonians without regard to whether 
they had been tested before. This change lead to a drastic increase in testing numbers as 
well as a decrease in the percent positivity rate. The differences in total test numbers 
and percent positivity between the old and new reporting method became more 
pronounced over the summer months and in September as testing expanded across the 
state and many Oregonians were tested multiple times. 
Neither the old nor new method of representing testing levels in Oregon painted 
a complete or perfect picture of Oregon’s testing situation. Reporting new Oregonians 
tested provides a picture of how many unique Oregonians were able to access testing 
that might not have been before. However, anyone looking at the data would perceive 
that Oregon was conducting fewer tests than it actually was because the same person 
tested three times from March 1, 2020 to December 3, 2020 would only show up once. 
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Reporting the total number of tests performed faced the opposite issue. While 
this representation of testing data more accurately represented the number of tests 
performed in Oregon, it did not reflect whether testing was occurring for a larger 
number of unique Oregonians. As testing expanded across the state, providers, counties, 
and universities began offering repeated testing opportunities for asymptomatic 
Oregonians, and many were tested more than once. Additionally, repeated testing was 
built into the state’s long-term care facility (LTCF) testing plan, which required 
facilities to test every employee at least once a month starting in October, which 
amounted to at least 29,000 Oregonians being tested repeatedly.43 This meant any 
increase in testing numbers may have reflected the same Oregonians being tested 
repeatedly, not an increase in testing availability to Oregonians who did not previously 
have access to testing.  
Changes in how data was reported, alongside poor communication explaining 
the data, led to mis-perceptions about how well Oregon was responding to COVID-19. 
For instance, the way OHA reported total test numbers until December 3, 2020 
undercounted the actual number of tests performed in Oregon, giving the public the 
perception that their state’s testing was not as robust as others because OHA did not 
clearly communicate that they were only reporting newly-tested Oregonians and not 
total tests. This point was emphasized by numerous articles and publications made 
between July and November 2020, which described Oregon’s poor performance 
compared to other states, failure to expand testing, and included Oregon lawmaker 
                                                 






statements calling for improved testing.44 These publications suggest that OHA’s 
decisions about how to represent testing data affected not only the perceptions of the lay 
public, but individuals in positions of power in Oregon’s COVID-19 response. When 
OHA shifted to reporting all tests performed and not just unique Oregonians tested, not 
only did Oregon rise to the middle of the testing pack compared to other states, but the 
test-based data indicated that testing levels had in fact expanded between July and 
November 2020 (fig. 1). These observations make it clear that how data was reported 
and communicated influenced public and policy-maker perceptions of public health 
responses. 
Different data collection methods generated divergent results that presented 
different pictures of testing in Oregon. Not only did each set of data give the public a 
different sense of testing levels in Oregon, but each had vastly different policy 
implications. Test percent positivity was an important metric for determining many 
important COVID-19-related decisions, including how frequently staff and LTCFs had 
to be tested for COVID-19, when schools could move from remote to in-person learning 
and what counties would have to re-implement restrictions on businesses and 
gatherings. The metric is calculated by dividing the number of positive tests results by  
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Figure 1. Tests Reported by OHA using two Different Definitions for a Test 
This figure compares the total number of tests reported performed in Oregon each week 
from March 28, 2020 to November 14, 2020 using two reporting methods. Blue depicts 
the number of tests performed using the test-based method. Orange depicts the number 
of tests performed using the person-based method. 
the total number of tests. Using a test-based method increases the total number of tests 
compared to a person-based method, resulting in a lower percent positivity rate. 
Because this metric was dependent upon how OHA reported the total number of tests 
performed as well as the number of tests that come back positive, changes in how OHA 
reported testing data significantly affected test positivity rates. 
Differences in test positivity rate using both versions of OHA’s testing data 
would have led to different outcomes for students and teachers returning to school, staff 
at LTCFs being tested for COVID-19, and businesses and citizens in Oregon counties. 
For instance, using a person-based method that produces a lower positivity rate would 




method which produced a lower positivity rate, students would be allowed to return to 
the classroom. Using a person-based method might mean LTCFs must find the 
resources to test their staff every two weeks, while using a test-based method would 
indicate they only needed to once a month. The real-world implications of changes in 
how data was presented emphasizes how important it is to fully understand the uses and 
limitations of data when implementing policies based on the data. 
Considering that one of the functions of public health is to communicate 
information to various audiences in a way that allows receivers of information to 
properly interpret the information, the failure to effectively communicate testing data 
represented the breakdown of an important health function.45 This breakdown reveals 
that there is room, and a necessity, to improve public communication in the future.  
However, it is also important to note that OHA generated many of these 
dashboards and messaging platforms within a limited period of time and with limited 
staffing or staffing sources from other departments. Additionally, the behind the scenes 
systems OHA used to report data were not intended for collecting the volume of results 
generated by COVID-19 testing data. This made the system less efficient and caused 
periodic issues in reporting.46 It was not until December 3, 2020 that OHA updated that 
system, indicating the extensive amount of time it took public health to adequately set 
up reporting systems. Updating systems once a pandemic is already happening causes 
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problems in data collection and reporting when that data is in high demand. These 
observations warrant a call for preparing more robust data collecting and reporting 
systems alongside the ability to quickly hire the staff needed to manage those systems 
during future pandemic emergencies. 
Case Study 2: Oregon’s Assessment of Testing Capacity 
This case study presents another example of how the methods used in collecting 
and analyzing COVID-19 data, in this case testing capacity data, generated sub-standard 
results which affected political decision-making. Between late April 2020 and the end 
of July 2020, the Oregon Health Authority conducted five testing capacity assessments 
using surveys. The survey questions made pre-determined assumptions regarding the 
type of testing capacity data that would be collected. The survey process 
unsystematically collected data, and the data analysis process introduced faulty 
assumptions about how testing played out in Oregon. This resulted in a possible over- 
or undercount of testing capacity in May, and a serious underestimate of testing 
capacity in June and July.  
Since testing capacity should reflect a theoretical maximum, the metric should 
have been higher than the number of tests actually performed. At the time OHA 
conducted their assessments, the department was reporting tests using a person-based 
method, not a test-based method. Person-based data indicated that OHA’s assessments 
were reasonable, as actual testing levels did not exceed testing capacity calculations. 
Once OHA began retrospectively reporting using a test-based method in December 
2020, it became clear that OHA’s testing capacity assessments were undercounts, as 




on how data is reported matters. If OHA had chosen a test-based reporting method from 
the beginning, it would have been obvious that their testing capacity assessments were 
incorrect and allowed for the organization to make adjustments to the assessments. 
Testing capacity assessments matter because, in Oregon, they informed whether 
businesses and schools could reopen and certain social activities could begin following 
Governor Brown’s executive order 20-12, issued on March 23, 2020, which closed all 
non-essential businesses and required Oregonians to stay home unless purchasing 
essential goods or working an essential job. Perceptions of testing capacity also loosely 
determined when OHA recommend more groups of Oregonians for COVID-19 testing 
under their clinical testing guidance. This guidance was created by OHA for medical 
providers as a set of recommendations describing who to give COVID-19 tests to since 
they were in short supply. The higher the testing capacity, the more groups OHA would 
recommended get tested. Yet, an underestimate of capacity would mean Oregon was 
capable of testing far more Oregonians than OHA would recommend. Since testing 
capacity informed government decisions on when to initially reopen counties, it is 
critical to understand what went wrong when this metric was generated for Oregon. 
Methods for Defining Testing Capacity 
Testing capacity refers to the maximum theoretical number of COVID-19 tests 
that could be performed given limitless resources. This number is meant to capture the 
maximum amount of testing a provider, state, or the county can perform, especially in 
relation to how much testing is actually being done. If done adequately, one important 
piece of information testing capacity can provide is the gap between the number of tests 




underlying causes (e.g.: a shortage of testing machines, kits, or staffing) can illuminate 
the severity of supply chain issues or other limits on testing and help the government 
and health authorities secure and allocate resources to increase testing. 
While the definition of testing capacity seems straightforward—how many tests 
can be performed at any one time—actually calculating testing capacity is not so 
simple. Unlimited access to testing machines, test kits, supplies, staff and lab space 
would, in theory, allow for infinite testing. Therefore, testing capacity is often based on 
a specific limiting factor(s) that dictates the theoretical maximum. These factors could 
be equipment such as the machines used to analyze tests, test kits, general supplies 
needed to collect and transport samples for testing, or the number of staff on hand to 
process tests. However, calculating testing capacity by picking a limiting factor requires 
assumptions.  
Utilizing a different limiting factor yields different results. Additionally, if the 
assumed limiting factor is not actually the factor limiting testing, then the testing 
capacity calculation will be incorrect. For example, consider a provider with a machine 
that could analyze 100 COVID-19 tests per day and had all the resources to collect and 
analyze those tests, but only had enough staff on hand to process 75 tests each day. 
Using staff as the limiting factor would yield a testing capacity of 75 per day, but using 
testing kits or sample collection swabs as the limiting factor would result in an 
estimated testing capacity of 100 tests per day. 
The federal government’s assessment of Oregon’s testing capacity demonstrates 
how assessments of testing capacity hinge on different assumptions and generate 




testing capacity was and how it was distributed, the White House Coronavirus taskforce 
(WHCTF) coordinated a review of laboratory testing capacity based on the diagnostic 
testing machines in each state in March 2020. This model defined maximum testing 
capacity as the number of tests that could be performed on machines that could run 
COVID-19 tests given limitless resources (in both supplies and staffing) and running 
each machine at its max capacity three times a day.47  
Yet, the WHCTF likely over-estimated Oregon’s testing capacity by making 
unrealistic assumptions about how testing machines would be used. Their method did 
not consider the fact that labs in one state are not isolated systems. Commercial labs in 
one state process samples from their own and other states, increasing the capacity of 
other states while decreasing it in the host state. Additionally, the machines the WHCTF 
tracked are platforms that are used to run multiple types of diagnostic tests, not just ones 
for COVID-19. Therefore, it is likely that not all of these machines were being fully 
dedicated or even used to test solely for COVID-19. Using a different limiting factor, 
such as test kits, staffing, or using only machines being used for COVID-19 testing, 
would generate a lower estimate of testing capacity than the method the WHCTF used. 
This highlights some of the assumptions that are made when calculating testing 
capacity, assumptions that OHA also made when calculating Oregon’s testing capacity. 
March and April Testing Capacity Assessments 
In March and April 2020 when OHA was overwhelmed by COVID-19 and 
testing was still coming online in most Oregon labs, Oregon’s testing capacity was 
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determined through informal meetings between OHA and 9-13 hospitals and private lab 
directors. At this time, OHA did not have a grasp on the state’s testing capacity, as 
collected information was not comprehensive. The data may not have included all 
providers offering testing in Oregon, and did not include any tests being sent out to 
commercial or other private labs for analysis. 
The lack of formal data on testing capacity was concerning because OHA used 
that data to determine when to expand their testing guidelines. In a healthcare provider 
webinar, Dr. Tom Jeanne, the Deputy State Health Officer and Deputy State 
Epidemiologist, explained that OHA had expanded its testing guidance because testing 
capacity had increased and stay-at-home orders had led to declining case rates. As a 
result, more tests were available and fewer people listed under the previous testing 
guidelines would need them, leaving even more tests available. As a result, Oregon had 
a “more than adequate capacity” in Dr. Jeanne’s words, and updated their guidance so 
that symptomatic frontline workers and minorities, as well as asymptomatic contacts in 
congregate settings, were recommended for COVID-19 testing.48 Yet, the only data 
OHA had available was from their informal meetings, which estimated a testing 
capacity of around 3073 tests per day.49 Since this excluded any testing done by smaller 
providers and at commercial labs, the state’s actual capacity was likely higher than 
OHA predicted. This low estimate meant OHA did not expand their testing guidelines 
to encompass more Oregonians even when they could have based on actual test 
availability. 
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May Testing Capacity Assessment 
In late April, two months after testing began in Oregon, OHA conducted its first 
formal assessment of the state’s testing capacity in order to determine which health 
regions (fig. 2) met the testing capacity requirements for reopening. The criteria called 
for each region to have a testing capacity to test 30 out of every 10,000 residents per 
week. When looking at the information collected and compiled by OHA on testing 
capacity and personal communications,50 it is clear that this assessment of testing 
capacity was inherently unsystematic and introduced assumptions into the data that 
misrepresented Oregon’s actual testing capacity in unpredictable ways. It was not clear 
how data was collected, raising questions regarding how accurate and comparable the 
data was across testing regions. OHA allowed respondents to answer questions about 
testing capacity using their choice of definitions. Using different metrics meant the 
resulting data was of poor quality because responses were not consistent or comparable. 
Additionally, OHA made unsupported assumptions about how many days per week 
respondents conducted testing and how much COVID-19 testing supply scarcity was 
hampering testing. These observations are concerning because the testing capacity 
calculated from this survey influenced OHA’s decision to expand their clinical testing 
guidance, and gave counties the green-light to reopen business and allow larger social 
gatherings that increased the risk of COVID-19 transmission. 
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Figure 2. Oregon’s COVID-19 Testing Regions 
Oregon’s testing capacity was assessed by region during the first testing capacity 
survey in May 2020, and counties in regions that maintained a capacity of 30/10,000 
residents a week, alongside other requirements, were allowed to reopen. Note that 
regions 3 and 5, and 6 and 9, were considered one region for testing capacity reopening 
calculations.51 
Firstly, it was unclear who the surveys were distributed to and who filled them 
out. For regions 6, 7 and 9, the respondent is listed as the regional emergency manager 
and the capacity is listed by county with no breakdown by provider. Regions 1, 2, 3 and 
5 have their capacity broken down by providers and sometimes by the individual 
clinics. These differences suggest that the survey was either sent to regional emergency 
managers, some of whom distributed them to the counties and providers in their region, 
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or that testing capacity surveys were conducted by different entities in different regions. 
This is concerning because the best way to get accurate and comparable information is 
to standardize procedures as much as possible, and it is clear that this did not occur in 
Oregon’s May testing capacity survey. 
Even after contacting a few providers and county health department employees 
to ask whether they had filled out the survey, I was unable to clarify the situation. In a 
personal correspondence, Lane’s Emergency Coordinator revealed the county had a 
group composed of provider CEOs and county Public Health Officers, and the lump 
sum testing capacity listed for the county on the survey was determined through data 
collected during group discussions.52 Completed survey responses also appear on phase 
one reopening applications from Wallowa and Klamath counties, further indicating that 
the forms were filled out by county-level officials.  
On the other hand, the lab director for Asante, which has three hospital locations 
but only one entry in OHA’s survey summary, noted in an email communication that 
she had filled out the survey herself. Yet, it was unclear whether or not she received the 
survey directly from OHA or was asked to fill it out via a regional official, who then 
sent it to OHA.53 Unlike Asante, OHSU, a large metro-area provider with multiple 
locations, had three separate entries. The clinic coordinator for OHSU Scappoose, one 
of the entries, had no recollection of filling out the form, and suggested that perhaps 
someone from OHSU filled out this form for the entire health network.54 This 
demonstrates the wide variation in who filled out these forms and how the information 
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was collected, raising questions regarding how accurate and comparable the data was 
across regions.  
In Lane county, as well as other major counties in eastern and central Oregon, 
data was passed from multiple providers offering testing and compiled into one number. 
This lumping and passing up of data obscured any simplifications or gaps in the data. 
For example, Clackamas County Public Health’s survey response indicated one of their 
concerns was a “lack of infrastructure to evaluate or communicate private testing 
capacity at the local level,” suggesting that Clackamas’ county-level data was 
incomplete because they could not access testing capacity data from private providers. 
Overall, inconsistencies in OHA’s methods lead to questions about whether the data 
was useful to OHA or accurately described the testing situation in Oregon. 
Questions on the survey questionnaire also left many crucial terms undefined, 
leaving room for varied and inconsistent responses. Question 2 asked “what is your 
daily collection/testing capacity?” Daily collection and testing capacity are two very 
different numbers. Daily collection refers to the number of test samples actually 
collected, while testing capacity refers to the number of samples that could be collected 
or analyzed given a limitless supply of supplies and staffing. A couple of responses 
demonstrate that there was variation in how question 2 was interpreted and answered. 
Adventist Health Tillamook answered question two with the number seven, and 
indicated that this number was their actual daily collection. Legacy Health answered 
question 2 with the number 575, but in response to another question mentioned that they 
could test up to 7,000 samples a day on one of their testing platforms if they had the 




their daily collection or their testing capacity given the supplies they had on hand. OHA 
tried to assess testing capacity, but by making both daily collection and testing capacity 
acceptable answers and not clearly defining testing capacity, they degraded the quality 
of the data by compiling data that differently defined testing capacity and calling the 
final product Oregon’s testing capacity. This mish mash of data made the final metrics 
inherently uninformative. 
There also appeared to be overlap in capacity, in part brought about by 
confusion as to who (counties or individual health systems) filled out the survey. For 
example, Asante (a health system in region 5 spread across Josephine and Jackson 
counties) had an entry listing its testing capacity for the two counties it serves. 
Josephine county also had a row listing their capacity, and noted that, among other 
locations, Asante was doing testing for that county. This indicates there was double 
counting going on. Asante’s testing capacity was counted in its own entry and also in 
the entry for Josephine county. There were also two entries for the Bay Area Hospital in 
region 3, and each entry listed a slightly different answer to question 2. This close look 
at the data reveals discrepancies that could overestimated testing capacity. 
In addition to issues with the survey and raw responses, the processes OHA used 
to create polished testing capacity numbers for each testing region utilized predictions 
that were not well supported and further degraded data quality. The spreadsheet where 
regional total capacity was calculated shows that the testing capacity numbers for each 
region were summed and then multiplied by some factor smaller than one, reducing the 
overall capacity number and doing so significantly in some cases. In an email 




inquiring about the May testing capacity data, Hicks indicated that he multiplied the 
regional capacity numbers by a factor of about 0.64. Presumably this step would 
account for a loss of testing supplies and the fact that most testing labs were not 
working at full capacity to get a more realistic idea of how much testing Oregon could 
do.  
However, this calculation is dependent on accurate and consistent testing 
capacity data being reported to OHA and multiplying by a reasonably accurate and 
justifiable number. As has already been pointed out, respondents provided testing 
capacity numbers that used different definitions with different limiting factors. Yet, 
multiplying every response by the same variable to represent a loss of testing capacity 
due to supply shortages is only valid if each survey respondent has the same factor 
(staffing, testing kit shortage, etc.) limiting their testing, which, according to OHA 
surveys, was not the case.55  
It is also unclear how the multiplying factor was determined. Despite Hick’s 
comments in his personal communication, the spreadsheet used to calculate Oregon’s 
testing capacity shows that the multiplier for each region varied and was not in fact 
0.64. Using a different factor for each region implies that each faced different levels of 
challenges limiting testing capacity, yet there is no way OHA had a clear way to 
quantify testing challenges to come up with those factors.  
Furthermore, in order to get a weekly count of testing capacity, the data 
compiler assumed that each location collected the same number of samples seven days a 
week, which, as indicated by survey responses, was not the case in many testing 
                                                 





locations. Because question 2 asked for daily collection or capacity, and that daily 
number, after being multiplied by some factor to get the regional daily capacity, was 
multiplied by seven to get weekly capacity, this calculation and its assumptions made 
the data completely unreliable. The final capacity calculation had the potential to be an 
overestimate because of the assumption that all providers tested seven days a week. It 
also had the potential to be an underestimate if the 0.64 factor was too large. 
Despite the flaws in the raw data, the responses were compiled and ended up as 
six polished numbers representing the testing capacity in each testing region and the 
state overall. The poor quality of the data was especially concerning in light of the fact 
that the numbers were presented to the Governor’s Office as evidence that all regions 
could test 30 out of every 10,000 resident each week and were therefore eligible to 
reopen business and increase the size of social gatherings.56 These observations and 
interrogations of the data are crucial because, as OHA and Governor Brown’s reopening 
guidelines and goals mention, reopening relied on a robust testing strategy and system. 
Yet, reopening forged ahead using unreliable data that indicated each region met the 
testing component of the state’s reopening criteria.  
On top of the fact that the assessment made to determine if regions were meeting 
the testing capacity reopening goal was deeply flawed, the initial goal itself was fraught 
with assumptions. Oregon set a weekly testing capacity goal that was meant to include 
testing for all symptomatic Oregonians. This goal was based on the number of tests that 
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would need to be done to detect the predicted number of daily cases that would arise in 
Oregon. Oregon’s COVID-19 transmission model, put together by researchers at the 
University of Washington, predicted there would be 350 new cases in Oregon per day. 
OHA estimated that five contacts of each case would either develop symptoms or fall 
into a high-risk group, which would require running 1,750 tests per day or 12,250 a 
week. This raw number equated to testing 29 out of every 10,000 Oregonians each 
week, which OHA rounded to 30 per 10,000 Oregonians.57 
However, the model only considered current infections when Oregon was still 
under stay at home orders. The model did not take into account how reopening would 
increase infection numbers and therefore new daily infections. July daily case numbers 
usually ranged from the mid 200s to low 400s, but prevalence studies in Oregon and 
statements from OHA indicated that testing was not capturing anywhere near all of the 
new daily cases. In fact, OHA’s May-June seroprevalence study indicated that 9 out of 
every 10 cases went undiagnosed.58 So, based on Oregon’s new daily case numbers, it 
was safe to assume that Oregon was in fact seeing more than 350 cases a day. All of 
these assumptions indicate the Governor’s testing capacity goal was essentially a 
meaningless number. Although OHA acknowledged that testing would have to increase 
as Oregon reopened, OHA never released new testing goals or numbers.  
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Most important is the fact that in order to reopen, testing regions did not have to 
actually test 30 per every 10,000 Oregonians weekly, they only had to demonstrate they 
had the capacity to do so. In fact, at the time, no regions were actually testing that many 
Oregonians.59 Whether or not capacity estimates produced by OHA were actuate, if 
30/10,000 was the weekly testing rate Oregon “needed” but regions were not even 
meeting that goal, Oregon was not ready to reopen, even by OHA’s standard. If OHA 
had conducted a systematic testing capacity survey which avoided duplicate counting, 
collected capacity metrics using a consistent definition, processed data using made well-
supported assumptions, and considered the number of tests Oregon would need based 
on post-reopening models, the metrics might still have indicated Oregon could reopen. 
However, the state would be basing the decision on data generated with the appropriate 
methodology and quality. 
Flaws in this testing capacity data are also concerning because the data 
influenced when OHA decided to expand their clinical testing guidance. On May 1, 
2020, when testing guidelines expanded to recommend testing for any symptomatic 
individual, Dr. Dean Sidelinger, Oregon’s State Health Officer and Epidemiologist, 
outlined OHA’s testing strategy by stating  
we know there are populations that are more at risk because of their 
profession or background, so as capacity has increased we’ve updated 
our guidelines to get testing to those who need it the most. And now that 
we feel our testing capacity can meet the needs [to test any Oregonian 
with symptoms].60  
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OHA had estimated the state’s testing capacity was sufficient to test every 
Oregonian with COVID-19 symptoms. However, because testing capacity data was 
flawed, OHA could not be certain that the capacity to test every symptomatic Oregonian 
existed. There may have been a sufficient number of tests, but there could have been too 
few. If OHA overestimated the state’s testing capacity, symptomatic Oregonians who 
should have expected access to testing would not have access. 
June and July Testing Capacity Assessments 
It wasn’t until mid-June 2020 that OHA would conduct another testing capacity 
survey, and over the course of June and July the organization conducted another three 
assessments. These surveys were sent out to testing providers directly, clarifying how 
surveys were distributed, and tried to avoid the discrepancies that arose in the May 
survey by asking what the respondent’s weekly reagent allocation was and using this 
weekly allocation as an estimate for weekly capacity. While this was an improvement 
because responses would be based on the same testing capacity definition (table 2), this 
method assumed an idealistic scenario in which testing kit availability was the sole 
limiting factor on testing, all testing was done in-house, and providers used the entirety 
of their weekly allotment each week. However, the reality of the situation was much  
Survey 
Number Date
 Asked Problems 
1 Late May What is your daily collection/testing capacity? 
Respondents can provide daily 
collection OR testing capacity, two 
very different numbers 




What is your current reagent 
allocation from your vendor for RT-
PCR or NAAT assays? (List vendor 
and number of tests per week) 
Assumed an idealistic scenario in 
which providers get steady allotment, 
use all of it weekly, did not outsource 






Table 2. Summary of Testing Capacity Surveys  
more complex and dynamic. Additionally, some respondents could not give a clear 
number on their allocation because it was inconsistent due to shortages, meaning OHA 
had to use poor numbers or fill in the blanks using other data. By not using the same 
metrics for each provider to determine testing capacity, the assessments were 
inaccurate. These assumptions caused OHA to severely underestimate the state’s testing 
capacity.61 
 Since testing kit allocation was inconsistent, not every provider had a steady 
weekly allotment of supplies they could report to OHA. When information was 
incomplete, OHA made assumptions about respondents’ weekly capacity. St. Alphonsus 
Hospital indicated that their allotment was 30-60 testing kits per week. When extracting 
data to assess testing capacity, OHA lowballed and wrote that St. Alphonsus’ capacity 
was 30 per week. Grande Ronde Hospital listed two testing kit vendors, but only gave 
allotment for one vendor. As a result, their capacity was listed based only on their 
allotment from the listed vendor, lowering Grand Ronde’s capacity. When Kaiser’s 
Airport Way Lab and Sky Lakes Medical Center failed to provide weekly testing kit 
allocation numbers, OHA listed the number of tests performed the prior week as the 
labs’ testing capacity. This demonstrates how in instances when poor data was provided 
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How many tests can you perform 
per week with your current reagent 
inventory or allocation? 
Accounts for dynamic situation in 
which providers stockpile tests, 
outsource testing, and have other 
limiting factors, but likely respondents 




by respondents, OHA used different data or altered data when extracting survey 
information. Using inconsistent methods to compile data meant that the actual data 
OHA collected was different for different providers, making their overall assessment of 
Oregon’s testing inaccurate. 
OHA’s definition of testing capacity also assumed that providers completely 
used their weekly allotment of reagents and conducted all of their tests in-house. 
However, providers often rationed and stockpiled tests because they knew shipments 
were spotty. They could not use all of their tests in one week and expect more to arrive. 
Grande Ronde Hospital, indicated they had 696 Abbott ID NOW tests stored away, but 
OHA completely disregarded those tests in their capacity assessment, indicating that the 
hospital could only perform 50 tests per week based on their weekly allotment. St. 
Charles Medical Center reported a 240-weekly allotment from Cepheid, and that they 
had 1700 Hologic test kits on hand. Yet again, OHA disregarded these stockpiled tests 
and recorded their testing capacity as 240 per week. This indicates that stockpiled tests, 
even when mentioned, were not included in capacity counts, decreasing the overall 
capacity number. 
Many providers also sent tests to commercial labs outside of Oregon, increasing 
capacity beyond reagent allocation levels. Yet, under OHA’s definition of testing 
capacity as the number of testing kits available, any samples collected by a provider but 
analyzed at an out-of-state lab did not count towards testing capacity. For instance, in 
June, Salem Health Clinic noted they had an unlimited capacity to send patient samples 
to the commercial lab LabCorp. Interpath Laboratories, one of the largest testers in 




week, to a reference lab in Washington state. There were also five other providers listed 
in the same survey who sent out more than one hundred samples a week to out-of-state 
reference labs. In all of these cases, none of that potential for testing was integrated into 
OHA’s calculation of testing capacity. This led to a severe undercount of the state’s 
testing capacity. 
Finally, OHA’s model assumed that reagents were the only factor limiting 
COVID-19 testing in Oregon. OHA defined testing capacity as the number of tests that 
could be performed given the number of testing kits on-hand. This definition 
disregarded other factors such as staffing, equipment or other testing supplies, which, 
when scarce, would push testing capacity below the number of tests that could be 
performed based solely on testing kit allocation. The Enhancing Detection Report 
produced by the state in late April offers further evidence that OHA believed testing kits 
were the sole limiting factor months before.62 In the report, OHA indicated that no 
additional staff would be needed in May or June to meet target testing levels, 
demonstrating the state’s insistence that staffing was not and would not limit testing 
capacity in Oregon. It is shocking that OHA would make such a claim when, at the 
time, they were not collecting any formal information on how testing and capacity were 
being impacted by staffing levels.  
The assumption that testing kits were the sole limiting factor proved inaccurate 
in OHA’s fifth assessment of testing capacity completed on July 30, 2020. OHA 
collected information on the need for staffing and other equipment by asking providers 
to indicate and rank the type of testing support they needed. The results revealed that 
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staffing and equipment were issues for ~40% and 65% of labs respectively, and that 
15% and 20% of labs listed each as their top need, respectively.63 Because this 
information was not collected until late July 2020, these factors were left out of OHA’s 
assessments of testing capacity, potentially overestimating the state’s capacity. 
In mid-July, OHA sent out another two testing capacity surveys. These two 
surveys assessed testing capacity differently than the first three surveys, and did so in an 
improved manner, removing some, but not all, of the assumptions about testing capacity 
built into the second and third surveys. In the fourth and fifth surveys, OHA directly 
asked “How many tests can you perform per week with your current reagent inventory 
or allocation,” and used that number as the testing capacity. This definition of testing 
capacity improved upon the one used for the second and third surveys by considering 
the need for negative controls and that testing is dynamic and providers stockpile some 
of their weekly allotment or increase testing using reserve supplies (table 2). OHA also 
added a question that asked providers how many tests they sent out to be analyzed by 
reference labs, which would account for testing capacity through commercial labs. But 
ultimately, data from this question was not integrated in the final calculation of 
Oregon’s testing capacity.  
It is also likely many respondents still answered the question “How many tests 
can you perform per week with your current reagent inventory or allocation,” based on 
how many test kits they were receiving weekly. Respondents were likely extremely 
busy due to the pandemic, and the poor quality of responses to other survey questions 
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indicates that many respondents were not spending the time to go over questions 
carefully and parse out nuances in the questions. For instance, one survey question 
asked if supply chain shortages were affecting testing for other (non-COVID-19) 
diseases, but some respondents answered with how shortages were affecting COVID-19 
testing. Therefore, despite changing how the questions regarding testing capacity were 
worded, the two surveys conducted in July likely assessed capacity in the same way as 
the two June surveys. This also meant the July surveys faced the same shortfalls in 
assessing testing capacity previously described for the surveys distributed in June. 
In the end, OHA’s methodology and the assumptions they made in the process 
of generating surveys and collecting and analyzing testing capacity data led to a severe 
undercount of the state’s testing capacity in June and July. OHA did not take into 
account that providers might save a certain percent of each shipment, lowering their 
capacity, or have a test kit stockpile or commercial lab contracted to analyze additional 
tests, increasing capacity. OHA also assumed that testing kits were the only resource 
limiting testing capacity, when in reality, staffing and equipment shortages prevented 
some providers from utilizing all of their COVID-19 testing kits. While OHA’s 
assumptions could have over- or undercounted testing capacity, their ultimate 
underestimation was likely the result of not considering tests performed out-of-state by 
commercial labs. This is especially pertinent for the two July testing capacity surveys, 
in which Interpath Laboratories, a large private testing company in Oregon, sent 
thousands of tests per week to be tested out-of-state due to reagent shortages. 
The undercount of testing capacity likely impacted OHA’s willingness to 




Oregon’s weekly testing number remained close to OHA’s predicted capacity (table 3), 
indicating Oregon was testing almost as many people as OHA had assessed was 
possible. Even when calculated testing capacity increased by 15,000 tests per week 
between June 30, 2020 and July 22, 2020, publicly reported testing data showed 
concurrent increases in actual testing levels. In a July 13, 2020 press conference, Dr. 
Allen reinforced the point that actual testing numbers were close to OHA’s calculated 
capacity, and went on to emphasize that about 8,000 tests per week could be lost from 
the state’s testing capacity due to supply chain issues. This would make the state’s 
testing capacity even lower than OHA had calculated. Interestingly, between June 30, 
2020 and July 22, 2020, OHA did not make any changes to their testing guidance. This 
suggests that OHA did not perceive any increases in testing capacity sufficient enough 
to expand their testing guidance, and therefore did not make any major changes.  
 
Table 3. Number of Tests Performed Compared to Calculated Testing Capacity 
According to the person-based testing data OHA reported in June and July, 
OHA’s claims that testing capacity remained close to actual testing numbers and that 
supply shortages were further reducing testing capacity in the state seemed supported by 
the data. However, once OHA switched to a test-based reporting method on December 
3, 2020, the new data revealed that OHA’s calculated testing capacity was much lower 
Week Calculated Capacity Test-Based Total Person-Based Total 
June 10 33,000 43,205 28,394 
June 30 41,000 56,345 34,696 
July 13 41,000 62,123 40,549 
July 22 48,000 61,992 34,498 




than the actual number of tests being performed at the time (table 3). This meant OHA 
created its guidelines based on a low estimate of how much testing Oregon was capable 
of performing. Since their guidelines were influenced by their perception of testing 
capacity and availability, their recommendations were more limited than they could 
have been if OHA had an accurate picture of testing in Oregon. This is further evidence 
that how testing data was reported had a real-world impact on factors such as who was 
recommended for COVID-19 diagnostic testing.   
Case Study Conclusion 
OHA’s survey methodology created poor data that could over- or undercount 
testing capacity in May, and significantly underestimated capacity in June and July. 
Faults in testing capacity metrics had a real-world impact on actions taken by OHA and 
the state. In May, OHA used flawed testing capacity data to determine whether Oregon 
counties could resume activities that could increase the spread of COVID-19. Flawed 
capacity assessments in May, June, and July also shaped OHA’s decisions on whether 
to expanded their testing guidelines. In May OHA expanded their recommendations 
because they believed Oregon had sufficient capacity to test every symptomatic 
Oregonian, even though that might not have been the case. In July, OHA did not expand 
their testing guidance because they believed there was not enough capacity, when in 
fact the state was performing more tests than OHA’s testing capacity predicted it could. 
The implications of OHA not having an accurate picture of the state’s testing 
capabilities: OHA based their testing recommendations on a false perception of testing 




This case study of how Oregon assessed its own testing capacity demonstrates 
how different assessments of testing capacity affect political and public health decision 
making, and how different numerical results have different implications. While OHA’s 
survey methodologies and data were flawed, it is important to acknowledge that the 
organization was likely overstretched responding to the pandemic and were required to 
quickly put together testing capacity information. This likely led to many of the flaws 
pointed out in this section. Public health reports are generally prepared well in advance 
and executed using commonly accepted methodologies, which OHA did not have the 
time to do during a global emergency and a politically charged environment that needed 
data sooner rather than later. OHA stopped conducting these capacity surveys after July 
2020, indicating the organization either ran out of the resources to collect this data or 
realized that such surveys in their current form were not useful.  
The Missing Piece - Data Equity 
Data often serves as a cornerstone for determining how public health resources 
should be distributed, particularly when those resources are limited. Access to the 
appropriate data can help public health officials and departments determine who is most 
at risk, how to reduce risk, and how to ethically distribute resources. As I have already 
demonstrated, data quality has serious ramifications for the efficacy and appropriateness 
of political and public health decision-making. However, it is also important to note that 
prioritizing resources ethically requires not only good-quality data but the existence of 
metrics that uncover such inequities.64 Under egalitarianism, an ethical response means 
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allocating additional resources to the disproportionally burdened. Therefore, collecting 
accurate data on the appropriate metrics is a key step towards achieving an ethical 
response. While OHA did set testing goals to improve the equity and efficacy of testing 
in Oregon, they failed to collect data that could shed light on testing inequities across 
race, ethnicity, and location, and help the state better understand what testing resources 
were needed where. 
While it was clear that racial and ethnic minorities in Oregon were experiencing 
higher rates of COVID-19 cases, hospitalizations and deaths, only anecdotal evidence 
suggested that these groups in Oregon experienced more barriers to accessing testing 
because OHA did not collect concrete data on the number of tests performed broken 
down by race or ethnicity. Even though one of Oregon’s justifications for requiring 
reporting of COVID-19 test results via OAR 333-018-0900 was that “reporting of 
negative test results will further allow public health officials to assess risk to various 
demographic groups,”65 it was not until September 25, 2020 that OHA legally required 
providers to collect and report demographic data, including race and ethnicity, for 
individuals tested for COVID-19.66 While delays are understandable in an emergency 
situation, a system for reporting demographic data during other types of medical 
encounters was in place years before the pandemic. It is concerning that it took many 
months for reporting on COVID-19-related encounters to be integrated into that system, 
far too late for racial and ethnic minorities without testing resources.  
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OHA also failed to collect more granular data pertaining to how testing capacity 
was distributed throughout Oregon. OHA did not assess or report capacity by testing 
region or county (although they did in the May testing capacity survey which required 
an assessment of capacity on a regional level), or report the capacity of testing locations 
that primarily served minority communities or other underserved populations. Although 
testing capacity data was imperfect, attempting to assess capacity along racial, ethnic or 
rural/urban divides would further efforts to assess testing equity within Oregon. Such 
assessments would have allowed public health authorities to see communities where 
there were testing gaps and apportion supplies to fill in those gaps, resulting in a more 
equitable and therefore ethical response. 
Without data on testing broken down by race, ethnicity, location, or other 
demographic factors, it was impossible to determine whether testing in Oregon was 
distributed proportionally to disease burden or infection risk.67 This made Oregon’s 
response to COVID-19 testing unethical. The lack of critical data might have been the 
result of underfunded and understaffed public health systems, ad OHA and counties 
likely did not have enough staff on-hand to collect, compile and distribute this 
information. Seeing as similar issues were noted in previous pandemic responses, 
increased funding for staff and epidemiologists at health departments would likely 
improve future outcomes in data availability and help foster ethical pandemic responses. 
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Chapter 3: Testing Supply Distribution 
One key function of public health departments is implementing public health 
programs and interventions in order to improve the public’s health. Often, managing 
these programs means determining how to allocate and utilize resources.68 Since public 
health departments lack the funds to implement programs across the entire population, 
they often target interventions towards groups with a greater risk or prominence of the 
public health problem. As previously mentioned, data can help public health officials 
and departments ethically distribute resources. It is almost impossible to prioritize 
resources without data to help determine where those resources are most needed.69  
During the COVID-19 pandemic, state and local public health departments were 
tasked with managing resources and programs to reduce COVID-19 cases and deaths, 
including resources to facilitate COVID-19 diagnostic testing. Private companies also 
sold and distributed a large proportion of these supplies. However, many testing 
resources were limited and did not meet global demands. Since COVID-19 was a new 
virus, all diagnostic tests being used in Oregon (and the US) were new. Dozens of test 
kits from different companies were quickly developed and approved for use by the Food 
and Drug Administration, but each had to be produced and distributed from scratch - 
there was no stockpile of tests. Production could not keep up with the level of demand, 
leading to constant competition between countries, states and health care providers for 
testing kits. Completing those tests also required a multitude of other general supplies, 
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including swabs to collect patient samples, tubes and media to transport samples, and 
supplies for processing patient samples once they arrived at labs. Due to the 
unprecedented demand for COVID-19 testing, these general supplies were also hard to 
come by. Given the scarcity of COVID-19 testing supplies, not every provider could 
access all the supplies needed to test patients. 
This chapter lays out how no systematic method was used by either private 
companies or the state of Oregon to determine which providers would be allocated 
supplies. Both distributed supplies randomly or on a first-come, first-served basis. Even 
when criteria were outlined, there was insufficient data to distribute resources using the 
outlined criteria. The chapter then argues that supplies were not distributed ethically 
under egalitarianism because acquiring supplies had more to do with providers’ and 
counties’ size, luck, or willingness to request supplies, rather than with need 
proportionate burden or targeting the worst-off. 
Case Study 1: Cepheid Testing Kits 
In the first two months of the pandemic, Oregon labs, clinics and hospitals 
competing with one another for testing kits. Private companies distributed supplies to 
the largest providers with the most purchasing power, and did not utilize any clear 
criteria to determine what smaller providers would receive supplies. This meant 
hospitals and clinics serving the Portland metropolitan area or larger cities like Salem 
and Bend won the competition for testing kits, and only some smaller providers 
scattered across the state received them as well. Such distribution methods were 
problematic because they did not allocate supplies using metrics, such as population or 




need of testing kits. Instead, distribution simply reflected an entity’s size and purchasing 
power, leaving less populous areas of Oregon without substantial or reliable testing 
early in the pandemic. 
In Oregon, an overwhelming number of hospitals and labs bringing testing 
online in the spring of 2020 used machines produced by the company Cepheid. While 
large providers in metro areas were often prioritized to receive supplies from Cepheid, 
providers of all sizes across Oregon struggled to get a hold of sales representatives, 
were turned away or faced long wait times due to backlogs in producing testing kits. In 
April 2020, Kaiser, a major hospital system operating on the west coast, reported that 
they were receiving testing kits on a weekly basis. However, Kaiser was in the minority. 
Legacy Labs, the clinical lab for the hospital system Legacy Health based in the 
Portland-metro area, noted they had an outstanding order with Cepheid but were only 
receiving sporadic shipments. St. Charles Hospital in Bend was also able to order tests, 
but reported that tests were coming in as lump sum shipments and not on a regular or 
predictable basis. Salem Health, based in and around Salem, reported receiving large 
weekly shipments from Cepheid in February that, as of April, had stopped coming. 
When they attempted to order more, they were told there was a backlog.70 This 
indicates that even large providers with greater leveraging power due to the size and 
expense of their orders, were not receiving supplies in a systematic or reliable way.  
Although large providers faced challenges receiving their allocated testing 
supplies, mid- and small-sized hospitals could not secure an allocation to begin with. 
Providers in the large towns of Medford, Grants Pass, and Klamath Falls, as well as 
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rural areas such as Astoria, Coos Bay, Gold Beach, and Coquille, all reported either not 
being able to get to a representative to place an order, having orders cancelled, or being 
placed in a queue for at least 2-3 weeks. Even small providers in towns just outside of 
Salem, the second largest city in Oregon after Portland, reported the same barriers to 
ordering testing supplies from Cepheid. Smaller clinics in urban and highly populated 
areas could not access testing supplies either. Cepheid told NE Family Medical Group 
in Portland and The Corvallis Clinic in Corvallis that they would not send them any 
testing kits because large hospitals were being prioritized.71 While Oregon’s largest 
providers received Cepheid’s testing kits, mid- and small-sized providers across Oregon 
were unable to obtain kits to test patients. This left less-populated areas of Oregon and 
Oregonians without reliable testing early in the pandemic. 
Only a select few waiting in a queue reported receiving confirmation from 
Cepheid that they would eventually receive supplies. While all small providers reported 
contacting Cepheid sales representatives multiple times, there was no clear pattern as to 
why certain ones eventually received responses and others did not. Those who received 
testing kits reported simply being removed from the queue or receiving a response call 
from a sales representative without an explanation as to why they were being allocated 
testing kits. These shipments also varied in size and were sent to randomly-selected 
clinics across the state.72 So, while Cepheid clearly prioritized large providers, they did 
not have a clear framework for distributing testing kits to smaller providers in Oregon. 
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One explanation for why smaller providers were struggling to contact Cepheid 
was the lack of staffing on Cepheid’s end. According to information provided to states 
by the federal government, Cepheid had three representatives tasked with managing 
COVID-19 testing kits orders across the US, and the representative covering Oregon 
was also responsible for 21 other states. Other private companies such as Abbott, 
Hologic, and Thermo Fisher, only had one representative listed.73 While there were 
likely more people working on distributing testing kits internally, the lack of provider 
contact points for ordering kits from at private companies added to difficulties when 
attempting to secure testing kits. 
Whatever the reason, private supply companies did not utilize a systematic or 
data-driven method to distribute testing kits. Larger providers were prioritized, while 
some small providers were randomly chosen to receive supplies over others, resulting in 
differences testing availability between providers and across Oregon. 
Case Study 2: Oregon’s OpsCenter 
As with private providers, Oregon’s system for distributing state-owned 
COVID-19 testing supplies failed to use systematic criteria to allocate resources to 
counties. Most state-owned supplies were distributed using the Oregon Office of 
Emergency Management’s (OEM) OpsCenter. In this system, OEM acted as the 
intermediary, taking orders from counties and doling out tasks to the appropriate 
government departments to complete the request. This meant supply distribution 
occurred on a first-come, first served basis based on what and how much a county was 
willing to ask for and what government agencies delivered, not county-level data on 
                                                 




transmission, case, hospitalization or death rates that would indicate the severity of the 
situation between counties and the amount of supplies needed. As a result, some areas 
received all of the assistance they needed in a timely manner, while others did not, and 
the level of services varied over time. Even when the state laid out distribution criteria 
for specific supplies, they did not have complete or accurate data to determine which 
providers or counties met the criteria and who, of those who qualified, should receive 
them. Additionally, the state government did not maintain records summarizing state-
owned supplies across agencies. Without a comprehensive inventory, distribution was 
inherently unsystematic because the state could not determine how to ration existing 
supplies to counties. 
One excellent example is the distribution of federal Abbott ID NOW cartridges. 
Oregon providers who received an Abbott ID NOW machine through the federal 
government placed requests for the machine’s testing kits through the OpsCenter. 
Providers could request any number of kits as frequently as they desired; however, their 
ability to receive adequate levels of those kits varied across the state. In late June and 
early July, Sky Lakes Medical Center and Curry General Hospital reported consistently 
receiving half of the Abbott ID NOW test kits they requested or waiting up to two 
weeks to receive them. The Bay Area Hospital wrote that they had received plenty of 
Abbott kits, and Grande Ronde Hospital echoed that sentiment, stating they had 696 kits 
on hand.74 The fact that at the same point in time some providers received a sufficient 
amount of test kits while others did not suggests that the OEM and other state agencies 
filling OpsCenter requests did not use any sort of metric to determine how many test 
                                                 




kits each provider would receive because some had testing kits in excess while others 
were in desperate need of more.  
Information obtained through public records requests with the OEM also 
indicated disparities in how promptly supplies were distributed to different counties. 
When cases in Union county began rising in June as the result of a church-associated 
outbreak, all OpsCenter requests by the county for testing supplies and assistance to 
hold a drive-up testing event were completed within a few days. The urgency of the 
situation was recognized. A large request for 8,000 Abbott ID NOW COVID-19 test 
kits from Polk county on April 27, 2020 was completed in-full by DAS on May 10, 
2020. Yet, a similar request by Marion county for 10,000 Abbott ID NOW test kits 
made on May 7, 2020 was still listed as “working” on June 29, 2020, even though 
Marion county’s request was listed at a higher priority status than Polk county’s 
request.75 These significant disparities in how supplies were distributed throughout the 
state at the same points in time and over time indicate that Oregon’s OpsCenter system 
did not allocate supplies based on demonstrated need, even though the system ranked 
the priority of each request. Differences also demonstrate the system only helped bolster 
testing in some Oregon locations. As with testing supplies distributed privately, a better 
approach would have been to use COVID-19 metrics, such as test positivity rate, to 
assess the need of each county and allocate supplies based on those metrics, not what 
counties themselves requested. 
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While the majority of supply distribution to counties by the OpsCenter was not 
based on any clear metrics, beginning in April 2020 OHA did lay out guidelines for 
how it would distribute some supplies. However, OHA lacked the appropriate data to 
determine who met those criteria. When distributing the fifteen Abbott ID NOW 
machines, OHA indicated they would send machines out to: 
• areas of the state with no access to COVID-19 testing, 
• areas of the state with a limited number of first responders, 
• areas of the state where courier services for the state public health lab 
and commercial labs are limited or unavailable, 
• areas with a high population of older adults and other at-risk groups, and 
• areas where hospitals or clinics do not already have access to an Abbott 
ID NOW instrument. 
OHA also indicated they would prioritize other supplies for counties with the 
lowest testing rates, highest case numbers without testing availability, and with barriers 
to testing in a timely manner.76 However, the state had no solid data on what areas 
within counties had no access to testing or areas with limited courier services. 
Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 2, OHA’s data on testing capacity and testing rates 
was flawed, suggesting that OHA’s assessment of counties most in need may not have 
been accurate. This meant information used to determine what locations met some 
criteria were not actually determined using on data depicting county-level need. 
Furthermore, there were likely more than fifteen locations in Oregon that met at 
least one of the listed criteria when the machines were distributed April and May. In 
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that case, how did the state decide which locations would receive machines? Internal 
communications from OHA reveal that employees involved in the allocation process 
picked locations they thought had a need, and that machines were distributed to 
providers who indicated they wanted one.77 This suggests that distribution was based on 
a mix of first-come, first-served and personal perception.  
Differing assessments by the state and local providers also meant it was often 
unclear which counties met the listed criteria. Union county’s phase 1 reopening 
application stated their largest hospital, Grande Ronde, had the foresight to acquire 
supplies and put together enough testing kits to support the required tested capacity for 
reopening. Yet, OHA reached out to Grande Ronde hospital to offer them an Abbott ID 
NOW machine because according to OHA’s assessment of testing, the region needed 
more testing.78 Although the hospital initially declined, they did eventually accept a 
machine for use at their urgent care center. Different perceptions of testing capabilities 
at a state and local level reveal uncertainties surrounding whether supplies were actually 
going to where they were most needed. 
Governor Brown also created a county watchlist in July, with the intention that 
counties facing higher COVID-19 rates or sporadic transmission would be placed on the 
watchlist and receive priority and extra support from the state, including for testing.79 
While the watchlist implies that the state used objective measurements to determine 
what counties should receive additional supplies, the distribution of additional supplies 
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to those counties was still based on county demands and not metrics. The testing 
coordinator for Lane County reported that when the county was placed on the watchlist 
in mid-October, they received additional assistance in the form of staffing and event 
coordination. However, their supply allocation for other resources, such as testing kits, 
continued to be determined by how much the county itself requested from the state.80 
Furthermore, beginning in mid-December, OHA got rid of the watchlist, and simply 
suggested that counties who needed extra support should make requests through the 
OpsCenter.81 This demonstrates that despite bring prioritized for supplies, those 
supplies were still distributed based on county demand, not data indicating the volume 
of supplies needed in the county based on transmission rates or another metric. 
There was additional confusion over what agencies had supplies and who was in 
charge of procuring them. When I tried to get records of POs the state had for COVID-
19 testing supplies, I was told by OHA that the Department of Administrative Services 
had those records, and then by DAS that OHA had those records. Although I eventually 
received POs from both agencies, the response from DAS stated:  
this report only contains data on purchases made/orders placed by the 
Department of Administrative Services (DAS). While DAS is the central 
procurement authority for most state of Oregon agencies, and is leading 
the state's emergency procurement efforts related to COVID-19, it is 
possible, indeed likely that other state agencies—particularly the Oregon 
Health Authority—have procured testing supplies in response to this 
emergency.82 
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This statement identifies a major flaw in Oregon’s testing supply system. If supplies 
were coming in across at least two departments that were not collecting formal data on 
what supplies were available, as a state, Oregon had no sense of the inventory or 
availability of state-owned, or even private COVID-19 testing supplies.  
Tracking this data is not a far-fetched idea. Hospitals were required to report 
PPE inventory at least daily and that information was available publicly on OHA and 
OEM websites. So why not have labs and other entities regularly report on the testing 
supplies they have, instead of through irregularly distributed, ever-changing testing 
capacity surveys? Access to this information would allow counties and the state to track 
how quickly various supplies were being used, where and what supplies were running 
low, and what supplies were historically scarce, and then prioritize an order for securing 
supplies that are most needed. Without this information, the state was simply guessing 
what supplies were needed and at what quantity, which meant when the state made bulk 
purchases they were not necessarily ordering the testing kits, swabs, or reagents Oregon 
need. Furthermore, without a comprehensive inventory, distribution was inherently 
unsystematic because it would be impossible determine how to ration existing supplies 
to counties. 
All of this leads to the conclusion that Oregon’s system for allocating resources, 
like that of private medical companies, did not utilize a systematic or data-driven 
method. As a result, the distribution system met the needs of some counties, but failed 




Was Distribution Ethical? 
This section engages in a discussion of the ethical implications of both private 
and public COVID-19 test supply distribution in Oregon not using a data-driven or 
systematic approach to distribute testing supplies. The absence of frameworks for 
distributing supplies was unethical because some sort of framework for distributing 
supplies during a pandemic or epidemic is necessary to act ethically,83 whether that 
framework prioritizes healthcare workers, the medically vulnerable, or the socially 
vulnerable. A distribution scheme without such a framework was also unethical under 
an egalitarian lens because such a system, by nature, left the distribution of COVID-19 
testing supplies to chance or a first-come, first-served basis. This meant one’s chances 
of acquiring supplies had to do with size, power, or luck, and not need or proportionate 
to burden, as an egalitarian approach in public health would have it.  
Both characteristics of an unethical approach were apparent in how the state 
distributed publicly-acquired supplies. When supplies were distributed through the 
OpsCenter, the needs of some providers were met while others were in desperate need 
of testing supplies. There was no clear rhyme or reason as to why some counties 
received fewer supplies and had to wait longer to receive them, demonstrating the 
absence of a statewide distribution framework. This first-come, first-served system also 
meant a county with less need who made a request first might use up supplies that a 
county with greater need would not be able to access when making a request later. This 
meant distribution was not based on an egalitarian approach that favored the worst-off.  
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When the state did generate criteria for determining who would receive state-
owned supplies, there was often little concrete data to support such a distribution. 
OHA’s criteria for distributing Abbott ID NOW machines included prioritizing areas 
with higher case rates and higher proportions of older citizens or at-risk citizens. This 
aligned with an egalitarian framework, prioritizing supplies to sub-populations and 
regions with larger COVID-19 burdens. However, actual distribution relied on informal 
messages and word-of-mouth instead of concrete data and statistics from each Oregon 
county. Without such data, in practice supply distribution may not have matched the 
outlined criteria, making distribution unethical through the lens of egalitarianism 
because more vulnerable groups may not have actually received access to that resource. 
Distribution of supplies through private channels was similarly unethical. One 
major supply provider to Oregon, Cepheid, claimed they were prioritizing resources for 
larger providers and states with higher case levels. This may seem ethical because a 
framework was being used to source supplies to areas most impacted; however, it would 
only be under a utilitarianist framework. Such a framework aims to use resources in a 
way that provides the most benefit. Testing supplies would provide more benefit in 
areas where transmission is higher because they are more likely to find cases. However, 
such a distribution does not target the systematically disadvantaged, a key element of 
egalitarianism. This suggests that Cepheid was, in practice, more interested in selling 
supplies to providers with the most purchasing power than investing in equitable 
distribution by providing supplies to organizations that served any at-risk populations. 
Although, unlike with state and health authorities, this is not surprising considering that 




Despite failing to ethically distribute supplies, OHA and other state departments 
involved in the distribution process were extremely overwhelmed as the pandemic hit 
Oregon. They had little time to implement a robust system-wide framework and 
prioritization scheme or collect the data that could inform such a distribution strategy. 
Instead, attempts to be ethical came in bits, such as with the distribution of the Abbott 
ID NOW machines. This emergency situation emphasizes the importance of pandemic 
planning and preparedness. If OHA had drafted ethical frameworks beforehand and had 
additional data-collection resources, the state could have enacted an ethical distribution 
framework when an emergency or supply shortage was declared, and altered the 
framework over time as needed, as opposed to waiting until an emergency leaves the 
government already overwhelmed. 
Gaps in ethical distribution by private companies, while not surprising, also 
serve the crucial lesson that governments and citizens should not expect private 
companies to make public health decisions on supply allocation. While public health 
authorities are obligated to act ethically and fairly, businesses are not. This is why the 
Defense Production Act (DPA) is a critical executive power. Under the act, the federal 
government can require companies to prioritize the production of supplies for the 
government, who can then allocate those supplies in a more ethical manner than the 
company themselves might. 
If private companies or the state of Oregon had utilized metrics such as percent 
positivity or case rate to dictate supply distribution, not only would distribution be 




resources needed to uncover cases and outbreaks and track and subsequently track and 




Chapter 4: Testing Rhetoric and Access 
As mentioned briefly in chapter 2, one role of public health is communicating 
information to various audiences, including politicians passing legislation, medical 
providers, journalists informing the public, and the lay public itself. The skill is so 
important that communication is considered one of six competencies public health 
professionals are expected to have.84 Successful communication is key because it can 
improve the efficacy of disease prevention and health promotion programs and reduce 
the impact race, ethnic and socioeconomic disparities have on health outcomes, all of 
which are critical aims of public health.85 
As the lead public health authority for Oregon’s COVID-19 response, the 
Oregon Health Authority was expected to be experts compiling and disseminating 
COVID-19 knowledge to medical providers and lay Oregonians, including best 
practices for using COVID-19 tests. They were also expected to carry out COVID-19 
diagnostic testing and provide additional support to county health departments and 
communities to fulfill their public health role of tracking and preventing transmission 
on a population level and distributing resources towards the disadvantaged. 
This chapter investigates the clarity and consistency of OHA’s testing rhetoric 
and considers how testing rhetoric influenced actual testing practices, and whether those 
practices were equitable. In this chapter, I do not use the term rhetoric to refer to 
propaganda or the furnishing of intentionally misleading information. I use rhetoric to 
refer to the language, word choice, tone, and other linguistic factors surrounding how 
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information is conceptualized, discussed and disseminated. Rhetoric is important as it 
affects the clarity of information and influences how an audience receives and perceives 
that information. 
Findings reveal OHA passed decision-making to healthcare providers, allowing 
them to create their own testing protocols. Yet, there were inconsistencies between and 
among OHA’s written testing guidance and statements made by OHA representatives, 
and an overall lack of clear messages from OHA on who to test. As a result, individual 
providers generated internal protocols that differed across Oregon and over time. The 
decentralization of decision-making about who should be tested allowed for a piecemeal 
approach that virtually guaranteed inequities in test distribution. Without any state-wide 
testing use mandates, the distribution and use of COVID-19 tests was not equitable 
because racial and ethnic minorities and lower socioeconomic status Oregonians faced 
greater barriers when accessing testing. 
OHA Guidance Told Medical Providers to Make Testing Decisions 
One piece of consistent advice from the Oregon Health Authority and local 
public health departments surrounding how to get a COVID-19 test was to “call your 
medical provider.” This message was repeated by OHA representatives and in OHA’s 
clinical testing guidance. Despite changes in OHA’s testing guidance over time, they 
consistently emphasized that people who were concerned they had or were exposed to 
COVID-19 should call their medical provider to assess whether they needed to be 
tested, and that medical providers should use their own judgment to determine whether 




OHA’s message that providers could decide whether to order COVID-19 tests 
for patients was reinforced by multiple OHA representatives such as Dr. Dana 
Hargunani, OHA’s Chief Medical Officer, and Dr. Tom Jeanne, Deputy State Health 
Officer and Epidemiologist.86 In a March 31, 2020 health care provider webinar, an 
OHA representative explaining OHA’s clinical testing guidance directly stated that 
while “these are our current recommendations for the suggested groups of people who 
should be tested at clinics laboratories, and again this is just a recommendation, just 
guidance, it is certainly up to the treating provider to decide.”87 This indicates that OHA 
had no intention of enforcing their testing guidelines and wanted to give providers 
complete authority over testing choices. While this may have meant to empower 
providers to make decisions based on the patient in front of them and the supplies 
available, it would ultimately lead to drastic differences in how testing, particularly 
excess tests, were used across the state. 
OHA’s testing guidance reinforced messaging that left testing decisions to 
medical providers. Guidance from March 11, 2020 to April 30, 2020 told providers they 
could order testing for patients based on their clinical judgment. Testing guidance 
released April 20, 2020 told providers that for patients presenting with mild COVID-19 
symptoms, testing was at their discretion. This was despite the fact that at the time, 
OHA only recommended testing individuals with mild symptoms who were a part of 
specific groups. Guidance from May 1, 2020 to June 29, 2020 indicated that providers 
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could order COVID-19 testing “at their discretion.” Although OHA provided guidelines 
on who to test and not to test for COVID-19, because those the guidelines were not 
legally mandated, the phrasing of OHA’s guidance meant providers could test 
whomever they decided. Since they collected the vast majority of COVID-19 tests, this 
put overall decisions on who to test in the hands of providers and not public health 
authorities. 
In addition to giving providers this power, OHA encouraged Oregonians to get 
tested for COVID-19 via medical providers. OHA’s COVID-19 testing locator, 
published on June 21, 2020, emphasized this point, indicating: “it is always best to 
contact your health care provider about getting a COVID-19 test.”88 County public 
health websites, including Umatilla and Multnomah counties’, further propagated this 
message, telling website visitors that their first step should be to contact their primary 
provider.89 Even messages advertising community testing events, which are generally 
targeted towards those who cannot get access to testing through the healthcare system, 
made it clear that the healthcare system carried the primary responsibility for testing. 
For example, a press release about Malheur county’s free community testing event 
stated: “This testing option is not meant to replace or eliminate other testing offered by 
local healthcare providers. The goal is to supplement those options in order to ease 
some of the pressure on the existing system and make the process more accessible to the 
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public.”90 This rhetoric clearly demonstrates a system which placed the primary 
responsibility for COVID-19 testing in the hands of medical providers. 
In giving providers the freedom to test as they saw fit, OHA tried to create a 
rhetoric that framed providers as the limiting factor to expanding testing. In OHA’s 
Facebook Live Q ’n’ A on testing, Dr. Jeanne told viewers “Healthcare providers screen 
everyone who asks for a test or needs one. They use their judgment to decide whether to 
order a test or not. Now, we at the OHA have made a series of guidelines available to 
those healthcare providers to help them make these decisions.”91 Dr. Jeanne made a 
similar comment in a healthcare provider webinar given on April 28, 2020 in response 
to an informal survey which showed about 25% of health care workers surveyed 
thought OHA’s testing guidance was too restrictive. Dr. Jeanne responded by reminding 
providers that the guidance was not restrictive because the ultimate choice was in their 
hands.92 His comment was both preceded and echoed by other OHA representatives. 
These statements suggest that OHA was simply there to make recommendations but had 
no real control or power over testing decisions. This narrative separated OHA from 
healthcare providers by placing the responsibility on providers and not health 
authorities.  
Such rhetoric undermined OHA’s own authority and expertise, which it needed 
to take charge of if Oregon had any hope of a consistent statewide response. Testing 
guidelines help maintain equitable access across the state, particularly for populations 
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underserved by the healthcare system. When a provider picked who to test without 
regards to OHA’s guidelines, that put the more vulnerable at risk because they were not 
guaranteed priority access to limited testing supplies. However, instead of enacting laws 
to regulate how COVID-19 tests were used, something well within their authority 
during a public health emergency, OHA decided to place decisions on how to use scarce 
resources in the hands of providers, who do not have the same equity and social-justice 
based philosophies as public health departments. Since the majority of testing was done 
by those entities, it led to massive levels of unequally distributed testing in Oregon. 
OHA Provided Unclear Rhetoric on Who Should be Tested  
From March to July 2020, the Oregon Health Authority was not always clear as 
to what constituted adequate testing levels. Based on times clear definitions were 
provided, adequate testing shifted from testing only those who were severely ill or at 
medical risk; to having enough tests to test anyone with symptoms, asymptomatic 
contacts in congregate settings, and conduct surveillance testing; to increasing targeted 
testing at the site of outbreaks across Oregon; to having enough tests to test any Oregon 
who requested one. Changes in these definitions created confusion for Oregonians over 
whether Oregon was performing enough testing and for providers on most appropriate 
use of limited testing resources. 
Shifting and unclear definitions of “need” resulted from changes in who was 
dictating Oregon’s testing needs. When OSPHL was the only source of testing, OHA 
determined who needed to be tested based on their testing capabilities. As testing came 
online at private providers, OHA allowed those entities to determine who should be 




differed from what OHA presented publicly. As test availability continued to expand, 
OHA told Oregonians they should have access to a test if they wanted one, placing the 
power to define need in the hands of everyday citizens. Since various groups, public 
health professionals, medical providers and Oregonians, might have defined “need” 
differently, space was left for COVID-19 testing resources to be used differently across 
the state. 
In early March when testing in Oregon was limited to OSPHL, Dr. Sidelinger 
and Dr. Jennifer Vines, Multnomah County Lead Health Officer, indicated that testing 
should be reserved for Oregonians seeking medical care with COVID-19 symptoms 
who could be severely ill with COVID-19.93 Despite the fact that testing at the time was 
limited, when asked if the state had enough tests, Dr. Sidelinger responded that there 
were enough tests to meet the current demand.94 Within the context of the conversation, 
this meant OSPHL could test all Oregonians who met OHA’s testing criteria at the time, 
which was anyone hospitalized with COVID-19 symptoms. So, adequate testing in 
March 2020 meant testing people who had a medical need due to severe illness. 
In the same press conference, Dr. Sidelinger indicated he wanted testing to reach 
high enough levels so that “if we [public health] identify a case or cluster here in 
Oregon that we can adequately reach out, do a case investigation, test those that we 
need to.”95 Yet, it is not clear how he defined “need”—was it testing all close contacts 
once, all close contacts repeatedly during a 14-day quarantine, only close contacts with 
symptoms, close contacts at greater risk for severe illness, or some combination? 
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Failing to define “need” left space for providers and Oregonians to make different 
determinations as to who those individuals should be. 
As Oregon began offering more COVID-19 testing and OHA began generating 
testing guidance, who needed testing as capacity expanded remained ill-defined. 
Despite the fact that Dr. Sidelinger told providers in a March 12, 2020 press conference 
that they should not test patients with mild symptoms, he indicated that if such patients 
did seek care, providers could offer them COVID-19 testing at their discretion.96 This 
was reflected in OHA’s formal clinical testing guidance at the time.97 However, like Dr. 
Sidelinger, the guidance provided no considerations or criteria clinicians should use 
when determining who to test. This created uncertainty for both patients and providers 
as to who “needed” a test.  
This rhetoric also set a precedent in which providers, and not OHA, began 
dictating how many tests were “needed.” This structure led to different testing protocols 
and practices across the state. Health care systems generated internal testing guidelines 
based on their testing supply levels, staffing, and who they thought should be tested. 
Testing came down to the decision of individuals who may have been swayed by the 
number of tests available at their facility or internal guidance from their employer, not 
merely medical determinations such as age or underlying medical conditions, or public 
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health considerations like exposure and travel history. As a result, who “needed” testing 
looked different in different health care settings across the state. 
In that same press conference, Oregon Governor Kate Brown sent mixed 
messages about the state of testing in Oregon, going back and forth on whether 
Oregon’s testing levels were sufficient. She told viewers, “Of course we would like 
more testing but based on what I’ve been told from public health officials we have an 
adequate amount.” She later backtracked and said, “we are concerned about our testing 
capacity.”98 Here the Governor sent opposing messages, one that the state had adequate 
testing levels and another that testing capacity was too low. While her contradicting 
statements aimed to reassure Oregonians that the state was appropriately responding to 
COVID-19 while also acknowledging that Oregon should and would expand testing in 
the future, they sent confusing messages to Oregonians and providers as to whether the 
state required more testing beyond what public health thought was necessary at the 
time. 
An Oregon Health and Science University representative contradicted Governor 
Brown’s statements on March 16, 2020. The representative offered viewers a reason as 
to why testing in Oregon was not, in fact, adequate. He stated:   
We are concerned about the lack of ability to test at present because we 
don’t have any way of knowing who is actually carrying the COVID-19 
virus and who is not, particularly among Oregonians who are less 
symptomatic. So the difficulty is with people who are less symptomatic 
[have mild or no symptoms]. Do they actually have COVID-19? You 
don’t know who to isolate and who not to isolate, you don’t know who is 
and who isn’t infectious, so testing really helps us determine that on an 
epidemiological standpoint.99 
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While OHA’s clinical testing guidelines at the time recommended against testing 
outpatients with mild symptoms and provided no guidance about asymptomatic 
testing,100 and public health officials indicated those testing practices were adequate to 
Governor Brown, this expert demonstrated why that was not the case. This created 
further mixed messaging on the status of testing in Oregon and confusion for 
Oregonians and providers tasked with deciding when to test individual patients as to 
just who needed to be tested.  
About a month later, on April 8, 2020, Governor Brown’s mixed messaging on 
adequate testing took a complete turn when she admitted that testing capacity in Oregon 
was inadequate. Testing had only expanded since Brown had last declared that it was 
adequate, so how could it suddenly be inadequate? Governor Brown revealed that her 
stance was the result of discussions with multiple healthcare providers who expressed 
frustration over what they viewed as a lack of testing capacity in the state.101 What these 
exchanges suggest was that providers were seeing patients that they wanted to test, but 
were unable to due to a lack of testing availability, and therefore, testing was 
inadequate.  
These exchanges also suggest that public health officials and medical providers 
maintained different notions of ample testing, as it was public health officials in March 
who told Governor Brown that testing was adequate. In a press conference a week later, 
Dr. Sidelinger alluded to the fact that around that time many providers began testing 
outpatients with mild symptoms as more testing came online. However, it was likely 
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that these expansions were not sufficient to offer testing to all patients with mild 
symptoms, leaving providers feeling as though testing was inadequate. Since OHA’s 
testing guidance placed testing decisions on providers, they became dictators of what 
was considered adequate testing, and they decided testing was not adequate. This shift 
muddled OHA’s message over whether or not the state needed to expand testing 
because OHA and provider perceptions of what was considered adequate differed.  
At that same meeting, Dr. Sidelinger realigned OHA’s definition of adequate 
testing with providers’ by presenting the first clear definition for testing “need.” This 
definition reinforced providers’ desires to test more patients with mild symptoms but 
also deviated from prior implied definitions of “need.” Dr. Sidelinger referenced an 
OHA analysis which determined Oregon had to conduct 15,000 tests per week to test all 
Oregonians with COVID-19 symptoms, select groups of asymptomatic Oregonians, and 
conduct surveillance testing. He went on to say that 15,000 was the number of tests 
OHA was aiming for to make sure everyone who needed a test could have one.102 In 
this context, “need” meant any Oregonian with symptoms and select asymptomatic 
individuals. This was the first time “need” was explicitly defined both numerically and 
using defined groups of who should be tested. This definition was a departure from 
prior ones, which implied those who “needed” a test were either 1) those with severe 
COVID-19 symptoms or 2) those identified by medical professionals with mild 
symptoms. 
In July 2020, what the state perceived as sufficient testing changed again. 
Although Oregon was conducting far more than 15,000 tests per week by July 2020, 
                                                 




effectively meeting the testing “needs” OHA outlined in May, Governor Brown 
admitted that the state needed to increase its testing capacity as well as levels of 
targeted testing in areas of the state experiencing outbreaks.103 This meant what was 
considered adequate testing had clearly changed again because more testing was still 
needed in the eyes of the Governor. However, it is not completely clear what type of 
testing Brown was advocating for. Did she mean that the state simply needed to test 
more Oregonians, test more Oregonians in areas with higher case rates, test specific 
groups in areas with higher cases, or test more close contacts in areas of the state 
experiencing discrete outbreaks? Furthermore, OHA’s clinical testing guidance had not 
been updated since June 30, 2020 and no major changes were made until October 6, 
2020. This left providers completely in the dark when it came to determining how the 
state wanted to expand testing and who they needed to test to properly do so, creating 
even more space for divergent testing practices. 
As testing capacity continued to expand, OHA’s definition of adequate testing 
changed dramatically, moving from being able to test anyone who needed to be tested 
to anyone who wanted to be tested. In a July OHA testing Q and A, Dr. Jeanne stated 
that OHA’s goal was to reach a point where anyone concerned that they had COVID-19 
or wanted a test could access one.104 This represented a change in OHA’s messaging on 
adequate testing. Whereas before, adequate testing meant being able to test anyone who 
needed a test as defined by OHA’s clinical testing guidance or Oregon providers, it now 
meant offering testing to anyone who wanted. Such a rhetoric sent the public the 
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message that the amount of testing Oregon “needed” would be dictated by Oregonians, 
not OHA or medical providers, and that Oregonians should be entitled to tests, whether 
or not they were available based on testing capacity. 
 
Table 3. Summary of Changes in Testing Need from February to September 2020 
Changes over “adequate” testing (table 3) broadcasted the paradoxical message 
that there both was and was not enough testing. Furthermore, continuously changing 
messaging on who needed to be tested and how adequate testing was in the state 
generated public confusion over who should be tested for COVID-19. This also helps 
explain why providers implemented widely varying protocols that were likely based on 
how much testing was actually available to them. 
While OHA and the state’s rhetoric around what constituted adequate testing 
changed, such changes were necessary. Making statements that testing was sufficient 
served to sway and reassure the public that Oregon’s testing was at an appropriate level 
for the time being. The sudden an unprecedented need for testing globally meant that it 
would take time for more testing to come online and meet additional testing needs 
conceptualized by the state. Furthermore, changes in who needed to be tested are 
required to integrate emerging data-based evidence about communities most affected by 
Time Period Who “Needed” A Test As Determined By 
Feb 28-Mar 12 The severely ill or at medical risk for severe infection OHA 
Mar 12-April 8 Patients with mild symptoms Medical Providers (and later supported by OHA) 
April 8-July 29 
Anyone with symptoms, asymptomatic contacts in 
congregate settings, those randomly selected for 
surveillance testing 
OHA 




COVID-19 and also how its etiological agent, the SARS-CoV-2 virus, spreads. Doing 
so would promote the most effective use of testing resources to curbing the virus. 
Yet, practically speaking, OHA’s changing goals made it unclear how testing 
might expand in the state or who it would expand to. So, in the process of trying to 
reassure Oregonians that the state was doing enough COVID-19 testing, OHA 
generated confusion over what the future of testing in the state should look like, leading 
to different testing practices across the state. These differences were exacerbated by the 
fact that OHA left testing choices up to providers. 
OHA Provided Unclear Rhetoric on the Appropriateness of Asymptomatic Testing 
OHA’s confusing rhetoric surrounding testing was particularly noticeable in 
discussion of testing asymptomatic individuals. In this section asymptomatic testing 
encompasses testing individuals who, at the time of testing, do not have symptoms. This 
can include individuals who have COVID-19 but never develop any symptoms, pre-
symptomatic individuals who have COVID-19 but have not yet developed symptoms 
and will eventually, close contacts who may or may not have been exposed to the 
SARS-CoV-2 virus, as well as anyone who does not have COVID-19 but is tested as a 
part of mass testing or routine testing. OHA guidance surrounding asymptomatic testing 
was either unclear or contradictory, generating confusion for providers and Oregonians 
as to when testing various types of asymptomatic individuals would be appropriate 
(table 4). This guidance also failed to push for asymptomatic testing towards groups 
with disproportionally high rates of COVID-19 cases. 
Month Contradiction or Convoluted Message 





One representative stated asymptomatic individuals were less likely to spread COVID-19 
and therefore should not be tested. Another representative made a contradicting statement 
that COVID-19 was mainly spread by those not showing symptoms, creating confusion 
over whether asymptomatic individuals should be tested to prevent transmission 
June 
OHA’s written guidance tells medical providers to “limit asymptomatic testing” to listed 
groups, but based on the guidance and differing public statements by officials, it is not 
clear if providers should test someone from those groups whenever they request a test or 
only test asymptomatic individuals from those groups if they deem it necessary  
June OHA’s clinical testing guidance stated asymptomatic close contacts could be tested, but contact tracing guidelines stated such testing was not recommended 
June 
OHA’s testing guidance states in one location that health care and essential workers 
should not be routinely tested, but in another section includes those groups under 
asymptomatic groups that could be tested  
September 
An OHA representative tells medical providers that their guidance “never recommended 
for or against asymptomatic testing of contacts,” even though guidance from March 25, 
2020 to April 19, 2020 explicitly stated that testing asymptomatic individuals was not 
recommended 
 
Table 4. Summary of Unclear Messages Provided by OHA Around the Appropriate use 
of COVID-19 Diagnostic Tests of Asymptomatic Individuals 
Throughout press conferences in March 2020, OHA representatives repeatedly 
indicated only patients whose illness was severe enough to require hospitalization 
should receive a test. However, that same month OHA released guidance that 
contradicted these verbal statements. Guidance released March 11, 2020 suggested that 
it was ok to test asymptomatic individuals. The guidance was vague, simply stating, 
“providers may decide to proceed with testing on the basis of clinical judgment.”105 So, 
the only guidance for making testing decisions were the two words “clinical judgment.” 
OHA’s updated guidance released March 16, 2020 provided more explicit 
considerations for testing when using “clinical judgment.” The guidance listed two 
criteria to consider: 1) Epidemiological risk factors (close contact, travel, or working or 
living in a congregate or healthcare setting) and 2) clinical presentation (symptoms and 
                                                 





negative for influenza).106 None of the guidance explicitly stated patients had to present 
with symptoms to be tested. It was not until the next guidance update released March 
23, 2020 OHA explicitly wrote “asymptomatic persons and those with symptoms that 
do not necessitate medical evaluation are not recommended for testing.”107 Differing 
messages from health authorities and OHA’s written guidance, one which discouraged 
asymptomatic testing and another that allowed for it, created mixed messages for 
providers as to whether it was ok to use scarce testing resources on asymptomatic 
patients. 
In mid-April OHA began recommending testing for asymptomatic contacts in 
congregate settings, but not for close contacts without symptoms outside those 
settings.108 Dr. Hargunani justified limiting asymptomatic testing by explaining that 
even though there were individuals infected without symptoms, those individuals were 
less likely to transmit the disease than symptomatic counterparts.109 Just a week later in 
a May 1, 2020 press conference, Dr. Sidelinger contradicted Dr. Hargunani and stated 
COVID-19 was spread largely by those not showing symptoms.110 This contradiction 
was problematic because it sent mixed messaging regarding the transmission of 
COVID-19, and implied a need for testing more asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic 
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individuals, potentially creating confusion for providers and Oregonians as to whether 
testing asymptomatic individuals would be appropriate.  
Yet, Dr. Sidelinger added that OHA’s stance on not testing asymptomatic 
contacts would remain the same because with or without a test, the public health 
recommendations were the same: anyone potentially exposed to COVID-19 should stay 
home.111 Such a statement failed to acknowledge the hardships that come from a 14-day 
quarantine, particularly for lower income and minority communities. Additionally, if a 
close contact were infected but never tested, public health officials would not perform 
contact tracing on that person, potentially allowing the virus to spread unchecked and 
resulting in an under-reported number of cases, concealing the severity of COVID-19 at 
any given point in time.  
On June 2, 2020 OHA expanded its testing guidance to allow for greater levels 
of asymptomatic testing. Yet, this guidance provided contradictory messaging, both 
discouraging and allowing asymptomatic testing. The document used negative 
language, telling readers to “limit asymptomatic testing to the following groups,” which 
included close contacts of confirmed or presumptive cases, those exposed in congregant 
settings, migrant workers arriving in Oregon, and anyone identifying as African 
American, Latinx, Asian, American Indian/Alaskan Native, or Pacific Islander.112 This 
phraseology suggested that providers should not have to test the listed groups, but if 
they have to conduct any asymptomatic testing, it should only be in those populations. 
This is particularly concerning because the expanded guidance was meant to help 
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improve testing levels in minority communities disproportionately impacted by 
COVID-19, but did not explicitly call for asymptomatic testing in these communities. 
Additional messaging from OHA representatives in the news muddied how 
providers should interpret and carry out the new guidelines. In a statement to the 
Oregonian, OHA director Patrick Allen said “We think they [minorities] should be 
tested, if they seek it.” But another OHA spokesperson Jordan Modie said testing 
asymptomatic minorities, “might be appropriate, e.g., to inform public health 
investigations; but we are not recommending that it be done routinely […] Health care 
providers should use their judgment.”113 These two statements sent different messages. 
Allen’s statement suggested that any individual from a minority group should be tested 
if they seek it. Modie’s statement suggested that testing asymptomatic minorities should 
not be regular practice and that it would be appropriate to turn those individuals away. 
OHA placed responsibility on medical providers to carry out the all-important work of 
providing testing to underserved minorities, but offered opposing messages on whether 
they should test asymptomatic individuals in a minority community. 
This confusion manifested in different perceptions among Oregonians and 
providers as to whether asymptomatic testing was an appropriate use of testing 
resources. A Latinx couple saw OHA’s updated guidance and assumed that they would 
be able to access testing as asymptomatic individuals with no known contact to a 
COVID-19 case. However, when they reached out to two Portland-area providers, the 
couple were told that they could not be tested because they did not have COVID-19 
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symptoms. This demonstrates how a lack of coherent and clear messaging alongside a 
rhetoric that decentralized testing decisions resulted in different perceptions 
surrounding asymptomatic testing. The Latinx couple believed they could get tested, but 
medical providers did not. 
Those same June guidelines also contained additional contradictions. Despite the 
fact that the guidance said close contacts of confirmed or presumptive cases could be 
tested for COVID-19, OHA’s contact tracing protocols did not recommend testing for 
close contacts under monitoring unless they begin to show symptoms,114 meaning 
contact tracers would not tell close contacts without symptoms to get tested even when 
testing guidance allowed providers to test those individuals. Practically speaking, this 
meant a close contact might think, based on OHA’s guidelines, that they should seek 
out testing. However, if they were being monitored by contact tracers following OHA’s 
contact tracing protocols, they would be told not to seek testing. This contradiction 
would have generated confusion for Oregonians as to whether or not, as an 
asymptomatic contact, they should expect to get tested. 
The guidance also recommended limiting asymptomatic testing to a small subset 
of groups, including healthcare and essential workers in congregate settings such as 
healthcare facilities, food-packaging plants, agriculture, or correctional facilities. Yet, 
that same guidance document contradicted this recommendation. The document 
explicitly stated “OHA does not recommend routine screening of asymptomatic people 
for COVID-19, including health care and other essential workers.”115 This statement 
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seems to suggest that this group should not be tested if they were asymptomatic, even 
though they were included in the list of people who could be tested if asymptomatic. 
However, there is a subtle difference. In the statement, OHA was recommending 
against routine testing (for example testing all nurses once a week). This is different 
than an asymptomatic nurse with no known exposure getting tested once because they 
felt the need to and had access, which according to OHA’s guidance was ok. While 
such differences may have been apparent to people within OHA, the guidance sent 
conflicting messages to providers and congregate setting workers as to whether 
asymptomatic testing was appropriate. 
Statements made by OHA representatives in September and October, later in the 
pandemic, also indicate internal confusions over whether asymptomatic testing was or 
was not recommending by OHA historically. In a September 3, 2020 health care 
provider webinar, Dr. Jeanne told providers that “Our [OHA’s] investigative guidelines 
have never recommended for or against asymptomatic testing of contacts.”116 Dr. 
Jeanne’s claim that OHA had never recommended for or against asymptomatic testing 
was false. Just four months prior, in a May 26, 2020 health care provider webinar, he 
stated OHA was generally not recommending testing of asymptomatic patients.117 
Additionally, all OHA clinical testing guidance from March 25, 2020 to April 19, 2020 
explicitly stated that testing asymptomatic individuals was not recommended. 
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Conflicting messages not only painted an unclear picture of how OHA expected 
providers to use COVID-19 tests, but also discredited OHA’s authority. 
In a press conference held October 6, 2020, the same day OHA released new 
clinical testing guidance, OHA Director Allen told viewers and the press that thanks to 
expanded testing, OHA could begin recommending testing of all close contacts, even if 
they did not have symptoms.118 The OHA director’s statement revealed two key points. 
First, that from June 22, 2020 to October 6, when OHA’s guidance technically allowed 
for testing asymptomatic contacts, OHA did not actually want those individuals to be 
tested because they were only now telling providers they should test asymptomatic 
contacts. Second, Allen’s statement contradicts what Dr. Jeanne said a month prior 
about OHA not being for or against testing asymptomatic contacts. If in October OHA 
was just beginning to recommend testing asymptomatic contacts, the implication is that 
prior, OHA was not recommending for that use of tests. These retrospective statements 
on past testing recommendations reveal that how OHA conceptualized using tests was 
not how they communicated it in official documents. This is another example of mixed 
messages coming from OHA to providers and the public on whether this form of 
asymptomatic testing was appropriate. 
OHA’s reasoning for not strongly recommending asymptomatic testing to 
providers and the public was founded upon poor reasoning. OHA used the argument 
that such testing would likely yield false negatives, making the test un-useful and giving 
individuals a false sense of security. OHA’s clinical testing guidance from May 9, 2020 
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to June 29, 2020 indicated that the sensitivity of PCR tests for people without symptoms 
was low.119 In two separate healthcare webinars, OHA representatives told providers 
that asymptomatic individuals were more likely to receive a false negative result from 
PRC tests and tests in general, providing a false sense of security for those individuals. 
Dr. Jeanne also claimed it was likely asymptomatic individuals had a low viral load and 
therefore false negatives would be more common.120 What is noteworthy about these 
comments is that they were made either just before or well after OHA changed their 
testing guidance to allow for limited asymptomatic testing. So, again, while OHA 
allowed such testing in their publicly-released guidance, they continued to discourage 
asymptomatic testing, sending conflicting messages.  
Had OHA clearly and strongly recommended for asymptomatic testing, it is 
possible that providers throughout the state would have offered such testing. Testing 
more individuals without symptoms would provide public health authorities with 
greater information about transmission levels, prevalence and distribution patterns in 
the state, especially since a high percent of individuals remain asymptomatic. Armed 
with this information public health could make comprehensive and better-informed 
decisions on appropriate interventions and guidance about safe activities. Such testing 
would also uncover previously undetected transmission, initiating contract tracing, 
isolation and quarantine before further spread could occur, further reducing cases. 
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Overall, OHA’s official testing guidance and representatives sent out mixed 
messages on whether and when asymptomatic testing would be appropriate. This, 
alongside OHA’s message that testing decisions were up to providers, offered little 
assistance for entities across Oregon trying to decide how to use testing resources. As I 
will discuss in a later section, many organizations offered COVID-19 tests to a wide 
range of asymptomatic individuals, indicating that they were tuning OHA out because 
they were inconsistent, contradictory, and unhelpful when it came to figuring out how 
to use tests. This led to divergent testing practices across the state that exacerbated 
inequities in accessing COVID-19 tests, particularly among groups and communities 
facing greater barriers to accessing health care services. 
Public Health Testing Roles were Placed in the Hands of Private Providers 
Public health’s role is to prevent disease and promote health and health equity. 
In the context of COVID-19 testing, this meant conducting widespread diagnostic 
testing without regard to symptom or contact status to prevent disease transmission, and 
testing groups underserved by the private medical system.121 However, during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, public health agencies did not have enough resources to 
accomplish these goals statewide. As a result, traditional public health were placed into 
the hands of the private medical system. This occurred both through OHA’s clinical 
testing guidance placing those responsibilities on providers and naturally due to high 
demands for COVID-19 testing from congregate settings such as essential workplaces 
and long-term care facilities. This posed an issue because private systems are not 
incentivized to provide care to minorities without insurance or other barriers to testing, 
                                                 




while public health is. As I will later demonstrate, this resulted in unethical testing and 
stark differences in testing over time and space in Oregon. 
There were two ways in which the Oregon State Public Health Lab tested in 
ways which aligned with its epidemiological duties. Beginning March 25, 2020, OHA 
carried out testing for anyone symptomatic in a congregate setting. On April 20, 2020 
they began offering testing to asymptomatic individuals in those settings. Beginning 
April 4, 2020, OSPHL began COVID-19 testing for patients with symptoms seen at the 
tribal health centers NARA and Chemawa.122 Testing symptomatic and asymptomatic 
individuals in congregate settings served the public health role of preventing 
transmission because authorities could quickly detect and isolate cases in settings where 
transmission would cause a large number of cases. Offering testing at tribal health 
centers provided medical services to a group with barriers to the healthcare system.  
While the OSPHL offered testing in congregate settings, they also allowed and 
told private medical providers to do the same. Prioritizing testing for non-Native 
American racial/ethnic minorities was also left up to private medical providers. 
According to OHA’s June 2, 2020 clinical testing guidance, testing asymptomatic 
persons who may have been exposed in a congregate setting, asymptomatic migrant 
workers upon entry into Oregon, and asymptomatic people from specific minority 
groups was acceptable if testing capacity allowed.123 Testing asymptomatic contacts in 
congregate settings and proving testing for migrant workers and minorities with no 
known exposures but with greater risk due to social vulnerabilities falls under the public 
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health department’s roles of preventing the spread of disease and providing services to 
those with barriers to the healthcare system. Yet, OHA’s guidance told providers to take 
on these roles. 
This was problematic for achieving equitable testing because not many medical 
providers took on the role of testing racial and ethnic minorities without symptoms. Out 
of four large providers in the Portland-metro area, Oregon Health and Science 
University was the only one who followed OHA’s guidance and explicitly offered 
testing to minorities without symptoms.124 This exemplifies how traditional public 
health, social-justice-based duties were placed into the hands of private medical systems 
that did not always follow through on the public health role assigned to them by OHA’s 
testing guidance. This was problematic and unethical because it meant racial and ethnic 
minorities with higher barriers to testing and higher COVID-19 case rates did not 
receive increased access to testing. 
Although OSPHL on paper would not explicitly test racial/ethnic minorities 
besides Native Americans, OSPHL did contribute to some testing for BIPOC 
communities because they analyzed tests from some community testing events that 
targeted those communities.125 However, community testing events throughout the state 
for minority groups relied heavily on private medical systems to offer services to the 
socially vulnerable. In Marion county, local public health authorities (LPHAs) partnered 
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with Woodburn Ambulance to run testing events for the Latinx community.126 In Lane 
county, LPHAs ran community testing events for Latinx and African American 
communities in partnership with Willamette Valley Toxicology and the University of 
Oregon.127 ¡Salud!, a private provider that serves migrant farmworkers, provided free 
testing for this population as they entered Oregon for grape harvesting.128 In these 
instances, private medical systems conducted testing aimed to equitize diagnostic 
testing and prevent transmission in congregate work settings, a traditionally public 
health function. 
Providers also assisted in mass testing at workplaces when a few cases of 
COVID-19 were detected among employees. In two outbreaks at Pacific Seafood, one 
in a Newport and the other in a Warrington facility, the company hired a private lab to 
test every facility employee.129 Klamath Health Partnership, a federally qualified health 
clinic that receives public funding but is not run by public health authorities, conducted 
testing for an agricultural workplace in Klamath Falls when a few workers tested 
positive.130 OSPHL provided mass testing for some facilities when an outbreak arose, 
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including for two seafood plants.131 But despite OSPHL’s involvements in mass testing 
at select workplaces, they were not always involved in this process, and budget and 
resource limitations affected how much testing public health authorities could conduct 
to trace the spread of COVID-19 in workplaces.  
In a July healthcare webinar, Dr. Jeanne reinforced the fact that OHA did not 
have the resources to test every migrant farmworker in Oregon.  
We have helped provide testing and support in agricultural and food 
processing facilities with outbreaks. At this point I’m not sure if we are 
able to provide testing from public health for all farm workers as the 
arrive [in Oregon], that is our recommendation. We do recognize there 
are some real concerns about employers who many not be excited to test 
their workers because they have a conflict of interest in wanting to have 
workers working and not quarantined or isolated. So there are some real 
concerns.132 
In a testing capacity survey, Josephine county health authorities indicated it would be 
impossible for the public health department to conduct facility-wide testing without 
additional assistance if a single COVID-19 case arose in a large workplace. The 
response indicated: 
We question how we can do this kind of wholesale asymptomatic/mildly 
symptomatic testing without significant support: for us to contract to a 
private lab could cost close to 25k, and we currently have only about 50 
test kits available to us as the LPHA. We believe the overwhelming 
majority of these people could obtain testing through a drive through, but 
without centralized capacity to do outbreak related testing, it is not clear 
how effective that strategy would be for detection.133 
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In the same survey, Clackamas county public health also noted that the testing needs at 
workplace outbreaks were far beyond what the public health department could manage, 
suggesting that workplaces in the county were relying on private health systems for 
testing when it was needed. 
These excerpts indicate that Josephine and Clackamas counties’ local health 
departments and OHA were unable to fully carry out the public health role of 
widespread testing to prevent transmission in a congregate setting. They did not have 
enough testing kits, nor did they have the funding to outsource testing to a private 
company. This would mean employers and companies would have to pay for these 
services themselves through private means. And as Dr. Jeanne pointed out, some 
employers were not incentivized to do so. Without guaranteed testing from public 
health, the ability for employees or residents to get tested on a facility-wide scale was 
based on choices made by the private companies running the facilities. Some facilities 
might decide to dedicate the financial resources to such an effort, while others might 
not. As I will demonstrate in the next section, this resulted in inequitable testing 
practices because some congregate facility residents were tested, while others were not. 
It is clear that OSPHL and local public health authorities in Oregon did not have 
the capacity to conduct anywhere close to the amount of testing that was needed to fully 
carry out public health duties, particularly widespread facility testing and testing for 
disproportionately impacted and underserved minorities and those without access to the 
health care system. As a state, public health authorities only had one lab, and resources 
were limited at the county level. This also helps explain why OHA placed testing 




infrastructure and capacity to test was. Given the dominance of private health care, 
underfunded public health systems and the fact that public health testing was reliant on 
private systems with their own agendas (which do not always align with public health), 
public health authorities need either more funding to carry out more testing themselves 
or increased authority over the private system to conduct testing to meet public health’s 
goals. 
Rhetoric Lead to Differences in Access Across Geography, Time and Space 
While OHA created testing guidance and recommendations for providers 
offering COVID-19 testing, OHA told providers that the ultimate decision on whether 
to order a test for a patient would be in the hands of individual providers and sent mixed 
and changing messaging over when testing certain types of patients was appropriate. 
This led to wildly different testing practices across the state and exacerbated testing 
inequities. By placing the ultimate decision on providers, OHA created a space where 
medically trained professionals and the health care system became the creators of 
testing guidelines and criteria, which varied over geography, time and space.  
I use “geography” to refer to differences between counties, different parts of the 
state, or the same spaces (e.g.: hospitals, correctional facilities, community testing 
events) in different parts of the state. I use “time” to refer to differences in who could 
get tested one month compared to another (e.g. March vs August). I use “space” to point 
out differences in testing accessibility in different types of locations where COVID-19 
testing took place (e.g.: hospitals, correctional facilities, community testing events). 
These terms are all important because they offer a way to recognize and capture just 




tested was dependent upon factors which were out of the control of individuals looking 
to access testing. 
The Importance of Location and Space: Differences in Protocols at the County Level  
Since OHA did not establish guidance for testing by Local Public Health 
Authorities, testing protocols and recommendations varied between Oregon counties.134 
What is clear from this data is that the types of assistance county public health 
departments would provide to congregate settings (such as long-term care facilities, 
correctional facilities, and agricultural workplaces) ranged from simply coordination, to 
working with or contracting with providers, to themselves providing testing supplies 
and/or personnel to collect test specimens. As seen in figure 3, the number of counties 
that provided no response or an unclear response regarding their role in testing at 
LTCFs, food and agricultural facilities, and correction facilities were 28%, 50% and 
50%, respectively (shown in grey). The percent of counties who stated they would 
provide testing supplies were 31%, 11% and 14%, respectively (shown in green). The 
percent of counties who stated they would provide testing supplies and staffing to assist 
were 22%, 14% and 22%, respectively (shown in blue). The percent who stated that 
testing would be provided by private providers were 17%, 25% and 14%, respectively 
(shown in red). Counties offering testing supplies and personnel gave assistance under 
varying circumstances, ranging from as needed, to only those with symptoms, to close 
contacts (with or without symptoms), to everyone in that facility. Additionally, not all 
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counties offered the same treatment to different types of correctional facilities, with 
many favoring or offering more assistance to LTCFs. 
Counties offering different types of testing assistance to different types of 
congregate facilities indicates responses to outbreaks likely differed in different Oregon 
counties. These differences also reflect a broader decentralized response, in which 
counties were expected to follow some baseline rules and provide certain services, but 
were left to fill in gaps left by the state, including deciding how much or how little they 





Figure 3. Summary of Types of Testing Assistance Offered by Counties to Congregate 
Settings. 
This table summarizes the percent of counties that offered testing assistance to LTCFs, 
food and agricultural workplaces and correctional facilities. Gray indicates counties that 
offered no assistance, red indicates counties that offered assistance via private 
organizations, green indicates counties that offered to provide testing supplies, and blue 
indicates counties that offed testing supplies and personnel. Different shades of green 
and blue represent different categories of who (symptomatic, asymptomatic etc.) could 
access those supplies.  
The Importance of Space: Differences at Long-Term Care and Correctional Facilities 
Despite advocating for asymptomatic testing in congregate settings with 
suspected COVID-19, OHA’s plans and actions made it clear that testing was not 
equally distributed between different congregate settings. Although congregate settings 
vary, testing protocols and practices in two very similar congregate settings, long-term 
care facilities (LTCFs) and correctional facilities, were strikingly different, with LTCFs 




In early June, OHA released a plan to test all residents and staff at LTCFs 
(nursing homes, residential care, and assisted living facilities) in Oregon by September 
30, 2020 and then implement routine testing whereby each LTCF staff member was 
tested at least once a month. Meanwhile, guidance from OHA and Oregon’s Human 
Service’s Agency Operation Center outlined extensive measures to combat COVID-19 
in correctional settings, but never directly called for inmate testing beyond inmates with 
symptoms or with direct contact to a confirmed case. Instead, prevention measures 
relied heavily on symptom screening, interviews, as well as isolation and quarantine 
measures. OHA’s guidance also told correctional medical staff to refer to CDC 
guidance to determine if and when inmate testing was appropriate.135 Yet, CDC’s 
guidance did not give any definitive answers either, simply telling readers to consider 
various factors without providing explicit situations in which testing should be 
performed.136 
Difference in guidance and testing requirements were reflected in actual testing 
numbers at both types of facilities. While all LTCF employees and residents statewide 
(a total of 57,400 people) were tested by early October, only 7,153 inmates in Oregon, 
just over half of the sitting population, had been tested.137 However, because inmate 
                                                 
135 “ODOC COVID-19 Infection Prevention, Testing, and De-Escalation Protocol” Oregon.gov, last 
modified July 6, 2020, https://www.oregon.gov/doc/covid19/Documents/tiered-protocol-institutions.pdf;  
Oregon Health Authority, “Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
in Correctional and Detention Facilities,” last updated August 18,2020, 
https://sharedsystems.dhsoha.state.or.us/DHSForms/Served/le2288s.pdf.  
136 “Interim Considerations for SARS-CoV-2 Testing in Correctional and Detention Facilities,” The 




137 “Long Term Care Facility COVID-19 Testing,” Oregon.gov, accessed October 6, 2020, 
https://govstatus.egov.com/or-dhs-ltcf-testing; “COVID-19 Status at Oregon Department of Corrections 





populations circulate, far more than 13,000 individuals had been in a correctional 
facility during the first six months of the pandemic. This meant the portion of total 
inmates in correctional facilities that had been tested from March 2020 to September 
2020 was lower than 50%. 
The stark difference in testing protocols and the percent of LTCF employees and 
residents tested compared to correctional facility inmates reflects how COVID-19 
testing levels were different across spaces in Oregon, in this case among different types 
of congregant facilities. 
The Importance of Geography: Differences at Major Healthcare Providers in August 
From June to August 2020, testing availability greatly expanded in Oregon; yet, 
OHA made no major changes to their clinical testing guidance during those months. 
Given a lack of formal guidance and confusing statements from OHA representatives on 
how to use tests, as more tests became available, individual providers made different 
choices on how to use the greater quantity of tests available and developed their own 
internal testing criteria. 
A snapshot of testing protocols at a few major Oregon providers in late August 
2020 demonstrate divergent and unclear protocols (table 5). COVID-19 websites for 
Samaritan Health and Providence stated they would only test patients with COVID-19 
symptoms. Meanwhile, Kaiser, Peace Health, Legacy and OHSU stated they were 
testing patients with symptoms, and would test patients without symptoms who meet 
specific criteria.  Kaiser, Peace Health and Legacy used vague clauses such as  
Provider Criteria 




• Entering a facility for certain surgeries 
• Require testing for other reasons 
OHSU 
• Giving birth, having surgery or other qualifying inpatient procedure 
• Close contact with someone who has been diagnosed with COVID-19 
• Public health department required testing for contact tracing 
• Migrant/seasonal agricultural worker 
• Black, African American, Latinx, American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, 
Asian American or Pacific Islander 
• Has a disability 
• English is not their first language 
Peace 
Health 
• Anyone admitted to inpatient care 
• Those with concerns about active infections 
Providence • Hospitalized patients 
Legacy • Those who believe they were exposed 
Samaritan • No patients without symptoms can be tested 
Sources: Listed Provider Websites 
Table 5. Criteria for Asymptomatic COVID-19 Testing at Select Private Providers in 
August 2020. 
“concerned about active infection or exposure” and “require testing for other reasons,” 
to describe the asymptomatic patients they would test. This phraseology was unspecific 
about just who those patients were, and suggested that providers were not following 
explicit guidelines but judging the need for testing on a case-by-case basis.  
In the few cases specific reasons for asymptomatic testing were mentioned, different 
providers took different stances. OHSU’s criteria aligned with OHA’s clinical testing 
guidelines at the time. Kaiser stated they would test those who required one for travel, 
while Legacy explicitly stated that they would not perform tests for that same purpose. 




Oregonian on a first-come, first-served basis.138 This indicates that testing criteria and 
the ability for asymptomatic individuals to be tested differed across providers in 
Oregon, reflecting a decentralized response to testing whereby OHA presented testing 
guidelines but choose not to enforce them.  
The Importance of Geography: Differences in Community Testing Events 
Community testing was unevenly distributed across the state and largely 
inadequate for filling gaps left by testing in the private sphere. Not all local county 
public health departments in Oregon carried out community testing, and among a 
sampling of those who did, the frequency and accessibility of such events greatly varied 
(table 6). Umatilla and Lincoln county held sporadic, one-time events, while 
Multnomah, Clatsop, and Union counties offered testing on a regular weekly basis in 
the same location. Malheur and Lane fell in the middle of the spectrum, frequently 
holding events but in different locations throughout each time. 
The criteria for testing at community county events was not the same county-to-
county. Multnomah and Union county only tested individuals with symptoms, and 
Clatsop prioritized those with symptoms or who were close contacts. Meanwhile, Lane 
and Malheur offered some testing events exclusively to members of minority  
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County Date(s) Frequency and Time Criteria 
Multnomah Beginning 6/8/20 
By appointment M/Th  
9:30am-4:00pm 
Symptoms; focus on BIPOC and 
those w/o insurance 
Clatsop Beginning 5/11/20 By appointment M/(T)/W
† Residents 18 or older; priority for contacts and those w/ symptoms 
Malheur May-August 2020 
Single weekday 10am-2pm 
1x month in 3 locations 
Oregon’s June 2, 2020 clinical 
testing guidance 
Lane Beginning 6/26/20 
Irregular in different towns 
throughout the county. Some 
events on weekends, late 
afternoons-early evenings 
Specific events for minority and 
other underserved communities 
(Latinx, Black, Frontline, Rural); 





Three one-time events None 
Lincoln Unknown One-time 
Close contact of a confirmed case 
identified by public health 
authorities 
Union 5/31/20 -7/14/20 
By appointment at public health 
clinics during clinic hours Anyone with symptoms 
Sources: County Public Health Department Websites 
 
Notes: The information presented in this table is not expected to be representative of all counties, but 
does not reflect scenarios unique to the presented counties either. Instead of compiling this information 
for all 36 Oregon counties, I chose these counties because they had the most easily accessible 
information and updated the information regularly. I monitored these county websites frequently in 
June, July and August 2020. 
 
*These events were conducted by private organizations Good Shepard Hospital and Oregon Child 
Development Coalition 
 
†Began M/T/W, but by July 14, 2020 switched to M/W only 
 
Table 6. Summary of Community Testing Events in Selected Oregon Counties from 
March 2020 to September 2020 
communities and others for the general public regardless of symptom status. Umatilla 
county’s three events were open to anyone who wanted a test. This meant that, 
depending on one’s county of residence, symptom status and self-identified racial or 




The Importance of Space: Differences in Medical and Community Testing 
Who could receive a test from a medical provider was much more limited 
compared to who could receive a test at a community testing event. As illustrated by 
tables 6 and 7, opportunities for asymptotic testing were much more expansive in 
community testing events. While testing by medical professionals often required 
asymptomatic patients to have a reason for getting tested, multiple community testing 
events—such as those in Clatsop, Lane, and Umatilla—allowed any asymptomatic 
resident to be tested, no questions asked. This meant that an asymptomatic individual 
seeking testing might be turned away by a medical provider, but not a community 
testing event. This would result in differing access to tests in different spaces. 
Anecdotes also demonstrated how, early in the pandemic, testing in healthcare 
settings was much more limited than community settings. One Oregonian left a 
comment during a July 24, 2020 OHA Facebook Live Testing Q and A on their 
drastically different ability to get testing at both types of sites. The comment read: 
I got a test a month ago in Parkrose when I walked by the testing site at 
the Latter-Day Saints church. I didn’t have symptoms and don’t think I 
had been exposed, but there was no line so I went ahead. I knocked on 
all doors in my apartment complex let them know and handle [sic] out 
masks given out on site. Results arrived two days later. I had my annual 
physical two days ago and asked about a test before visiting my parents. 
They said none available.139 
This comment clearly shows that medical providers limited testing, particularly of 
asymptomatic individuals, much more than community testing events, demonstrating 
how testing opportunities differed across spaces. 
                                                 







If a centralized response had been mounted with consistent and enforced testing 
guidance and protocols, Oregonians, regardless of their location, space, healthcare 
provider, or congregate setting, would have the same level of access to a COVID-19 
diagnostic test. In this alternative, two symptomatic individuals accessing testing via 
different medical provider would both receive a test. Two asymptomatic individuals in 
different counties would both be able to receive a test at the community testing events 
offered by their county. In the same month, an asymptomatic senior in a long-term care 
facility and an asymptomatic individual in a correctional facility would receive a test if 
they asked for one. Yet, this was not the case in Oregon. 
Were Tests Distributed Ethically? 
It could be argued that these variations in who could get tested based on 
geography, time and space made COVID-19 testing in Oregon unethical. According to 
egalitarianism, in order to be ethical, access to resources must be proportionate to 
burden and actions must be taken to remove barriers.140 A close analysis of testing 
practices in Oregon between March and September 2020 indicate that lower 
socioeconomic status Oregonians, incarcerated populations and racial, ethnic minorities 
faced greater barriers to accessing diagnostic tests; and were not tested proportionately 
to their burden of COVID-19 cases. Without any state-wide testing use mandates or 
sufficient additional efforts by OHA to get local public health authorities and private 
providers to target larger portions of resources to groups disproportionally impacted by 
                                                 





COVID-19, the distribution and use of COVID-19 tests was not equitable through an 
egalitarianist lens. 
Unethical Distribution Among Incarcerated Oregonians 
Procedures and recommendations limiting testing in correctional facilities were 
in stark contrast to testing plans for long-term care facilities (LTCFs). Given that 
LTCFs were the only group recommended for mass facility wide testing and routine 
testing, it is important to consider why Oregon chose to focus scarce testing resources 
on this population, and whether or not such a focus was ethical. The most apparent 
answer lies in the major difference between LTCFs and the other populations largely 
affected by COVID-19—the average age of people in each setting. Those living in 
LTCFs are older and therefore more likely to experience severe infections or 
complications that will land them in the hospital, ICU, or on a ventilator. They are also 
more likely to succumb to their infection.141 Therefore, an initial testing of all residence 
and staff followed by consistent testing of staff would help catch cases before the first 
symptomatic case arose, prevent infections that would lead to hospitalization or death, 
and help alert health authorities to the potential healthcare needs and manage health 
resources. This comprehensive mass testing plan reveals OHA’s first and foremost 
priority was to not overwhelm hospitals and the health care system. 
Although Oregon’s priorities were understandable, a failure to implement strong 
testing plans in other congregate settings reveals stark inequities in access to testing 
                                                 
141 In August, Oregonians over 60 had a 27% hospitalization rate and 9% case facility rate. Those rates 
for Oregonians of all ages were 8.5% and 1.7%, respectively. Source: Oregon Health Authority, 






between different types of vulnerable populations. As of September 30, 2020, the 
percent of confirmed COVID-19 cases among residence and staff was twice as high in 
correctional facilities as LTCFs. Three times the number of correctional facilities had at 
least one case of COVID-19 as LTCFS (table 7). This indicates that, while the raw 
numbers showed more cases at LTCFs, correctional facilities were actually seeing 
higher rates of COVID-19 than LTCFs.  







2,631 4.5% 303 0.53% 162 24% 
Correctional 1,384 7.9% 12 0.08% 12 80% 
Sources: Oregon Health Authority; Oregon Department of Corrections 
Note: Data on LTCF cases includes cases among Oregonians who were not residents or staff if they 
resulted from transmission that stemmed from those (for instance, the spouse of a health care worker in 
a long-term care facility). Therefore, LTCF totals may slightly overstate the number of cases and 
infection rates among residents. 
 
Table 7. Reported Cases of COVID in two Congregate Settings from March 1, 2020 to 
September 30, 2020 
Acting in an egalitarian fashion requires skewing resources towards the more 
disadvantaged. Seeing as there were higher case rates in correctional facilities, but 
higher death rates in LTCFs, whether OHA’s decision to mandate mass LTCF testing 
but not do the same for correctional facilities was an ethical decision depends upon 
whether death or illness is considered a greater disadvantage. The elderly were more 
disadvantaged because they were more likely to die from COVID-19, but adults in 
custody were more disadvantaged because they were more likely to be infected with 
COVID-19.  
While there is a case to be made regarding the vulnerability of both populations, 
a perspective focusing on the social vulnerability of detainees suggests that denying 




individuals have historically been treated as second-class citizens due to their criminal 
status. They also earn little to no income while incarcerated and have fewer freedoms 
than the rest of society. In this sense, these individuals are of a much lower 
socioeconomic status and are extremely vulnerable socially and economically. They 
have no resources or control over their own ability to be tested. They are not legally 
guaranteed testing, even if they ask for it. Residents in LTCFs have more freedom to 
access testing. Residents (or a resident family member if the resident is in assisted 
living) could secure a test themselves or request a test from caregivers. These factors 
place residents of correctional facilities at a greater disadvantage compared to LTCF 
residents and, under an egalitarian philosophy, deserving of greater resources.  
Yet, OHA’s decision to require testing for LTCFs and not even provide concrete 
testing guidelines for correctional facilities demonstrates that the state did not think 
incarcerated individuals were deserving of additional resources. At the county level, 
only 50% of LPHAs indicated they would provide testing assistance in the case of an 
outbreak at a correctional facility, and 38% indicated they would provide direct 
assistance, as opposed to passing off the task to private entities. Meanwhile, 72% of 
LPHAs indicating they would provide assistance to LTCFs and 53% offering direct 
assistance. According to egalitarianism, this was unethical because incarcerated 
individuals, a group more disadvantaged than residents of LTCFs, received fewer 
resources from counties. 
Further evidence of how correctional facility inmates were seen as less 
deserving of testing resources comes from statements and action from government 




order to reduce their risk of catching COVID-19. When she finally did in late June, only 
57 inmates were released, demonstrating that the government did not highly value 
prisoners’ well-being.142 In September 2020, Ron Miles, a spokesperson for the Eastern 
Oregon Correctional Institute (EOCI), home to the largest correctional facility outbreak 
in Oregon, told The Eastern Oregonian that EOCI would not test all of their staff and 
inmates because  
the availability of tests and the timely processing of them makes large-
scale or institution wide events impractical. A single institution would 
flood the local testing companies, using all of the local resources for an 
extended period of time, rendering these companies unable to help local 
hospitals and clinics.143  
While true, his statement was a bit disingenuous considering OHA required LTCFs to 
test all staff and residents over the course of three months and then test all employees 
monthly. That process certainly took up valuable local resources across Oregon as well. 
Was it ethical to take up local testing resources for LTCFs but not correctional facility 
inmates? According to egalitarianism, no. 
It is clear that the well-being of inmates was not valued as highly as residents of 
LTCFs. The difference in treatment is alarming because these two types of congregate 
settings are extremely similar in terms of epidemiological risk. Both contain a sedentary 
resident population, staff that come and go and interact with the outside world, close 
quarter and shared living spaces (such as eating and bathroom facilities), and have 
populations that spend large amounts of time indoors each day. While testing in 
                                                 
142 Conrad Wilson, “Oregon Governor Commutes Sentences of 57 Inmates Vulnerable to COVID-19,” 
OPB, June 25, 2020, https://www.opb.org/news/article/oregon-governor-commutes-57-prison-sentences-
covid-19/.  
143 Alex Castle, “COVID-19 Outbreaks in Umatilla County Prisons Still Growing,” East Oregonian, 





correctional facilities would likely require fewer resources than testing at LTCFs, OHA 
or the state had no desire to push for such testing.  
This could have been for many reasons. One likely reason was that the state was 
more focused on preventing deaths and determining that testing resources were best 
used in places where death rates would be higher. Another possibility is that social and 
cultural norms that devalue the lives of incarcerated individuals meant the majority did 
not believe this population should have access to a scarce, potentially life-saving 
resource in the same way the elderly should. While the state can ultimately justify 
testing in LTCFs because of higher hospitalization rates, failing to provide testing for 
inmates created inequities and was unethical from an egalitarian standpoint. 
Unethical Distribution Among Ethnic and Racial Minorities and Lower Socioeconomic 
Status Oregonians 
OHA and local public health department advice to “call your medical provider,” 
to get a COVID-19 test was based on the assumption that Oregonians already had one 
or knew how to navigate the health care system. These assumptions meant some 
groups—notably, racial and ethnic minorities, immigrants, and Oregonians with a lower 
socioeconomic status (SES)—who did not fit these criteria were likely underserved, 
overlooked and placed at a disadvantage when seeking testing from very early stages of 
the pandemic. Since OHA’s guidance on who should be tested remained just guidance, 
counties and providers were left to determine whether and how much they wanted to 
focus time and resources on additional testing resources for communities 
disproportionately impacted by COVID-19. However, state, county and private 




was unethical in Oregon because one’s chances of acquiring a test had to do with a 
variety of factors including experience navigating health systems, insurance status, 
location, and work schedule—factors other than need or proportionate burden. 
Private provider testing criteria exacerbated inequalities in who could access a 
test. Most were not offering tests to asymptomatic people. When they did offer 
asymptomatic testing, it was often due to the person being hospitalized for a non-
COVID reason or potentially exposed to COVID-19. They rarely focused on offering 
services or doing outreach to ethnical and racial minority groups or other communities 
disproportionally impacted by COVID-19 for asymptomatic testing, with OHSU being 
one exception (see table 6). Providers who did offer asymptomatic testing without 
restrictions took reservations on a first-come, first-served basis, meaning one’s ability to 
access these tests depended upon their knowledge of what was available. In the process 
of gaining that knowledge and securing a test, one would have to navigate online 
medical websites, make phone calls, and complete a pre-screening ranging from an 
online survey, phone or video chat, to in-person screenings. The need to reach out and 
complete a screening process created barriers and potential challenges for those without 
experience navigating health systems, who do not feel comfortable speaking English, 
and undocumented Oregonians and minority communities who were fearful of the 
medical system. 
Under an egalitarian philosophy this was unethical because it denied tests to 
communities who were most vulnerable to disease, the most likely to be exposed and 
infected. When considering that health care systems are oriented towards doing what is 




viewed as best practice from a public health perspective. Healthcare providers followed 
a more utilitarian approach, offering tests to patients with symptoms or who had been 
exposed to COVID-19 and were medically more likely to have COVID-19 than any 
given asymptomatic individual. The few that did provide testing to anyone on a first-
come, first-served basis also followed a utilitarian approach. If one considers the 
perspective that testing as a whole is beneficial because it leads to case detection that 
can stop transmission, testing offers the same benefit to everyone. It does not matter 
who gets those tests since the benefit of one test is equal whether it is given to a White 
or Black Oregonian, a white-collar worker or an agricultural worker.  
Publicly-funded county public health agencies stepped in with community 
testing events for front-line workers, at-risk racial and ethnic groups, those without 
insurance, who spoke a language other than English, and those who were fearful of the 
medical system due to their immigration status. However, these events were unable to 
adequately fill the service and ethical gap left by private testing because they were not 
widely available, sporadic, relied on a first-come, first-served basis, sometimes required 
people scheduling appointments ahead of time rather than just showing up, were 
advertised primarily in English and on public health websites, and were offered during 
limited times—many of them falling during the M-F, 9-5 workday. 
Multnomah, Clatsop and Union county all required participants to call ahead or 
pre-register for testing. This meant anyone who could not book a spot in advance might 
be rejected for testing or have to wait longer to receive a test. While Malheur and Lane 
county offered the largest number of community testing events, the events were 




difficult for someone to get a test right when they might need one since the location and 
time were constantly changing. Malheur held the events monthly in three different 
locations, Vale, Ontario and Nyssa. These three cities are located within the same area 
in the Northeast part of the county, meaning any county resident in another part of the 
county would have to drive potentially hours to one of those sites. The situation was 
similar in Multnomah and Clatsop counties, where the testing site was in one location in 
the county. So, even though testing was being offered more regularly in those two 
counties, residents would still need resources (transportation, time, and the ability to 
plan ahead) to reach the testing site.144  
Furthermore, many events took place during weekday working hours, creating a 
barrier for those working at jobs where they could not take time of, or feared that doing 
so could lead to job loss. Events in Multnomah county were held from 9:30am-4pm on 
weekdays, events in Malheur county took place on Wednesdays from 10am-2pm. 
Events in Clatsop county were also on weekdays, and after calling to secure a testing 
spot, residents would be assigned a time to show up for testing on the next upcoming 
testing date. This meant anyone who wanted to be tested by the county would have to 
make the testing time or not be tested at all. Additionally, the time of these events was 
the same every week or each time the event was held.145 The lack of non-weekday, non-
workhour appointments and lack of variety and options in testing times meant many 
people who could have been tested and wanted a test simply could not come at the 
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indicated times. Lane county was much better, offering testing events in the evening and 
on weekends. 
Community testing events were also extremely vulnerable to supply chain 
constraints and delays experienced nationally. Union county public health began 
offering testing services May 3, 2020. Two months later on July 10, the county 
announced it was experiencing delays in testing and four days later cancelled all 
community testing until further notice, limiting testing to those identified by public 
health officials.146 Clatsop and Malheur counties, who collected samples at community 
testing events and had them analyzed by commercial labs, reported increasing delays in 
receiving testing results over time. When Clatsop county began community testing in 
May, the turnaround time was five days. By August, it was seven to ten days.147 In May, 
Malheur reported that testing results from Quest had delayed, and hoped that switching 
to a Quest lab closer by would reduce the turnaround time to five days moving forward. 
However, in June and July the county continued to experience larger delays and opted 
to send samples to the OSPHL instead. Even with that change, they continued to expect 
a five to seven-day turnaround time.148 These turnaround times were well beyond the 
ideal 24-48 hours, and forced individuals to remain in quarantine while awaiting test 
results, a privilege that many attending community testing events did not always have.  
                                                 
146 Center for Human Development Public Health, “COVID-19 Public Health Update,” last modified July 
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147 “Community Drive-through COVID-19 Testing Begins Week of May 11,” Clatsop County Oregon, 
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While OHA, as the state’s public health department, was expected to step in 
with these additional resources to reduce or eliminate COVID-19 disparities, decades of 
underfunding for public health departments meant public health authorities in Oregon 
did not have the capacity to conduct anywhere close to the level of testing that was 
needed to equitize it. Instead of using public health’s police powers to equitize testing 
being done in the private sector, OHA generated testing directives that put equitable 
testing partly in private hands without enforcing such directives. This heightened 
unequitable access to testing among previously mentioned groups because private 
systems are not incentivized to provide care to the underserved. Since one’s chances of 
acquiring a test from a provider had to do with factors other than need or proportionate 
burden, and public health did not supplement enough testing to those groups 
proportionate to the increased risk they faced, the use of testing in Oregon was unethical 
under an egalitarian approach. 
Even when providers and community testing events had criteria, hours and a 
location that would allow migrant workers, ethnic and racial minorities, the uninsured, 
undocumented, non-English speakers and those with a lower socioeconomic status to 
secure a test, there were not adequate resources for finding those opportunities. Existing 
resources included county public health websites, OHA’s testing locator, and medical 
provider websites. These resources failed to break down barriers for the aforementioned 
groups because they were not comprehensive and included contradictory information, 
meaning those who were able to utilize those resources would still have to make phone 





Information provided on these reputable sources contained inaccurate or 
incomplete information about the testing criteria, making it even more difficult for those 
without a primary care provider to secure a COVID-19 test. OHA’s COVID-19 testing 
locator provided information on where testing was available and the criteria for testing 
at each location, but the information was not verified, meaning it could be inaccurate. 
Deschutes, Washington and Lane county health departments contained comprehensive 
updated lists of private testing locations on their websites. As seen in table 8, 
information on Washington county’s website was not comprehensive for every 
provider. The testing list on Deschutes County’s website was available in English and 
Spanish, but the website did not provide any information regarding the criteria for 
testing at each provider.149 Lane County also did not list specific testing criteria and told 
viewers to call providers first, as a referral would be required at all locations.150 
Provider Criteria Pre-Screening Cost for Insured 
Cost for 
Uninsured 
Kaiser Kaiser members with symptoms ? ? ? 
OHSU OHA’s criteria On-site Free Free 
Providence Anyone with symptoms and some without ? Free Free 
LegacyGo None ? Free $100 
Portland Urgent 
Care ? ? 
Free except for 




ZoomCare Anyone with symptoms Video ? ? 
Virginia Garcia 
Clinics 
Anyone with symptoms or 
high-risk individuals On-site ? ? 
                                                 
149 “Testing Sites,” Washington County Oregon, accessed August 27, 2020,  
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19 Testing Locations in Central Oregon 4/23/2020,” Deschutes.org, accessed June 24, 2020, 
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Anyone with symptoms or 
BIPOC individuals without 
symptoms 
Phone ? ? 
American Family 
Care None Video Free Free 
RiteAid Pharmacy CDC’s criteria Online survey Free Free 
Walgreens CDC’s criteria Online survey Free Free 
Source: Information pulled from Washington County’s public health website on August 27, 2020. 
 
Table 8. Information on COVID-19 Testing at Providers in Washington County in 
August 
So, while testing information provided by county public health departments helped 
Oregonians find a provider, individuals looking to get tested would have to contact 
them to verify whether or not they could receive testing at that location and schedule a 
test. Therefore, these resources did not reduce barriers for non-English speakers, 
undocumented Oregonians and minority communities accessing the health care system. 
One critical observation is that testing criteria for certain providers and testing 
locations differed depending on which source you went to for information. In August, 
Washington County’s COVID-19 testing sites page indicated Kaiser was only testing 
Oregonians with COVID-19 symptoms, but Kaiser’s own website indicated 
asymptomatic individuals could get tested in certain circumstances.151 LegacyGo’s 
website indicated they were only offering asymptomatic testing for those who may have 
been exposed, but Washington County’s website stated they were conducting 
asymptomatic testing for anyone on a first-come, first-served basis.152  
Provider websites also contained contradicting information. One page of 
Providence’s website indicated they were only testing those with symptoms who 
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worked or lived in congregate settings, were healthcare personnel, or were at higher risk 
for severe infection due to age or medical conditions. On another page, they indicated 
they were testing anyone with symptoms or who had been exposed to COVID-19 in the 
last two weeks.153 Yet, their coronavirus assessment tool told patients with no 
underlying conditions or medical concerns who had been exposed but did not have 
symptoms that they did not need testing. A lack of consistent information about who 
could or should get tested, even within the same organization, increased barriers for 
those without experience navigating medical systems because they would have to call 
around to find out if they were eligible for testing in a certain location.  
For individuals who could secure a test, another barrier was cost. A snapshot of 
Washington County Public Health’s testing page on August 27, 2020 (table 8), shows 
just how difficult it was to find information on test cost before getting tested. This lack 
of information might discourage the uninsured from getting tested. Although Section 
3202(b) of the CARES Act required providers to list the cash price of a COVID-19 
diagnostic test publicly on their website, even by August 2020, three major Oregon 
providers—OHSU, Kaiser, Providence—had not, further discouraging the uninsured, 
and even some with insurance, from accessing testing due to the fear of unexpected 
costs or co-pays.154 Overall, Oregonians, particularly those without a regular provider or 
experience accessing the medical system, had to dig around to find a place to get tested 
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based on their symptom and insurance status, creating multiple added barriers to 
accessing testing. 
OHA’s decentralized approach to testing that left decision-making to providers 
and counties resulted in a lack of resources for finding and securing testing, and a lack 
of testing itself. Overall, this meant one’s ability to access a COVID-19 diagnostic test 
not only differed by geography, time and space, but also by insurance status, 
documentation status, and experience navigating health systems. Barriers to testing 
disproportionately affected migrant workers and ethnic minorities who were more likely 
to be uninsured, undocumented, or only speak a language other than English. These 
groups faced larger barriers to accessing testing through the medical system due to 
potential costs, fear of deportation, and an inability to interact with and navigate the 
health system.  
Since Oregon could not provide resources to those groups proportionate to the 
increased risk they faced or reduce barriers or inequities in test access, a true egalitarian 
approach to COVID-19 testing was not achieved. As DeBruin, Liaschenko, and 
Marshall point out, “efforts to target resources to at-risk populations can succeed only to 
the extent that the state makes reasonable efforts to remove barriers to access.”155 
OHA’s response failed to adequately remove those barriers during the first six months 
of COVID-19 transmission in Oregon, diminishing the agency’s ability to maintain an 
ethical use of COVID-19 diagnostic tests in the state. If OHA had made sufficient 
efforts to standardize the state’s response and remove barriers, not only would the 
state’s response have been more ethical, but also more successful. These groups had 
                                                 




higher COVID-19 case rates, but less access to tests. Increasing their access would have 
meant more case detection and actions leading to reduced transmission, hospitalization 





Despite Oregon’s inability to appropriately collect and depict diagnostic testing 
data and mount an ethical response to diagnostic testing, it is worth mentioning that 
Oregon fared far better in the face of COVID-19 than many other states. A combination 
of strong, mostly accurate, public health messaging, statewide mask mandates, 
decisions about when to open and close businesses to and allow certain social activities, 
and Oregonians’ willingness to follow public health advice meant case rates, 
hospitalization rates, and death rates across 2020 were much lower in Oregon than most 
other US states.156 So, while Oregon’s process was not appropriate, the outcome of that 
response was comparatively favorable. 
More notably, perhaps, is that many of the issues surrounding poor data and 
unsystematic, unethical testing distribution were not unique to Oregon. At the federal 
level, there was no complete picture of diagnostic testing in the country and incongruent 
assessments of testing capacity. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s 
COVID-19 testing data page and weekly reports indicated that not all COVID-19 tests 
performed in the US were reported to the agency, meaning their metrics undercounted 
the number of diagnostic tests performed.157 When assessing testing capacity, Oregon 
chose testing kits as its limiting factor while the federal government used testing 
machines as the limiting factor, leading to different metrics of capacity at the state and 
federal level. Differences in such analyses are significant because the federal 
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government uses their data to allocate scarce COVID resources, giving little credence to 
state-level data. 
Poorly coordinated public distribution systems also existed at a national level. 
Evidence suggests that the federal government’s supply tracking and distribution system 
was not well coordinated. Documents obtained from the CDC on what testing resources 
were sent to Oregon only recorded two of the weekly shipments of 50 Abbott ID NOW 
testing kits supplied by the federal government. However, OHA recorded receiving 
such shipments from at least May 8, 2020 to July 5, 2020, much more than two weeks. 
A CDC representative suggested that the discrepancy existed because either the state of 
Oregon directly ordered subsequent tests from Abbott, or distribution was doled out to 
another agency.158 If the former is true, the federal government was placing the 
distribution of public supplies in private hands. If the latter is true, it indicates the 
federal government was uncoordinated and inconsistent in what departments handled 
tasks over time, and that there was little cross-talk between departments.  
Evidence also suggests that federal supply distribution relied more heavily on 
policies than data when allocating resources. When distributing Abbott ID NOW testing 
platforms and testing kits, specific policies around who could receive those supplies 
superseded evidence indicating who needed them. The Abbott ID NOW machine 
existed before COVID-19, and was used by providers to test patients for a variety of 
other diseases, including influenza. Many providers nationally and within Oregon 
already had Abbott ID NOW machines, they simply had to get the COVID-19 test kit to 
                                                 
158 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Testing Supplies Sent to Oregon,” (unpublished 





use their machine to test for COVID-19. However, Oregon authorities were told that the 
cartridges from the federal government could only be used for Abbott machines 
supplied by the federal government. This stipulation meant the state could not distribute 
those supplies to providers who already had an Abbott machine but needed testing kits. 
OHA’s unwillingness to dictate who should be tested mirrored the lack of 
guidance at the federal level. The CDC’s testing guidance rarely laid out specific 
scenarios in which testing should be conducted, and utilized suggestive, rather than 
authoritative guidance. Furthermore, the CDC never enforced any testing guidelines, so 
states, public health agencies, and individual providers were free to follow the guidance 
or ignore it, which they often did.  
These findings suggest that states and public health systems have room to 
improve future epidemic and pandemic responses. However, it is important to note that 
oftentimes these gaps in Oregon’s COVID-19 testing response resulted from 
underfunded and outdated public health systems. Decades of underfunding in public 
health has made effective responses difficult, but monetary, political and public support 
for public health activities can help public health systems embody some key best 
practices that were absent in Oregon’s COVID-19 testing response. Investing in public 
health systems matters for a few reasons. One, COVID-19 is not the last public health 
emergency governments and public health departments will have to respond and adapt 
to. Not only that, but public health is tasked with collecting, analyzing and presenting 
health data and developing public health interventions in the absence of pandemics. The 




departments to continue to act appropriately when the pandemic revealed weaknesses in 
the system?  
Testing is only one component of pandemic response. During the COVID-19 
pandemic, public health, the government and other entities worked to understand the 
biological underpinnings of the causative virus to develop treatments and vaccines, 
generate disease mitigation recommendations such as mask-wearing, and implement 
social support services for those who might have lost jobs or faced other fallouts from 
the pandemic. Health care systems and researchers worked to manage patients in an 
overwhelmed health care system while trying to determine the best way to treat and care 
for patients with a disease with no known treatments. All of those sectors had to quickly 
adapt to the onset of the pandemic to collect data, communicate within and outside their 
bubbles, distribute resources, and hopefully, act ethically. 
Yet, evidence suggests that ethical issues and concerns persisted in other areas 
of pandemic response. Although I stopped formally collecting data after the end of 
September 2020, I kept a close eye on COVID-19 response trends, and I noticed a 
familiar unethical trend in vaccine rollout—a lack of equitable access, which was even 
acknowledged publicly by OHA Director Patrick Allen.159 Early in distribution, a lack 
of coordination left some medical providers with extra vaccinations, which were 
randomly given to those who did not fit the existing criteria who just happened to be at 
the right place at the right time. As with testing, states created their own, divergent 
schemes for prioritizing vaccinations. In some states, teachers were first in line to 
receive a vaccination, in others, they were not; the dates when certain groups could start 
                                                 




to get vaccinated varied by state; the wealthy bought their way to the front of the line; 
and there were widespread reports of non-high risk, non-frontline worker and under 65 
individuals getting vaccination way ahead of others in those prioritized groups. While 
the United States is in a much better position than it was in 2020, these lingering 
concerns remind us that pandemic experience alone is not enough. Long-term 
investments in public health systems and centralized, systematic, authoritative, 
decision-making is essential for ensuring an appropriate response to pandemics and 
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